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About this Publication Series
This case-study is one of a series produced by participants in a Berghof research project on transitions from 
violence to peace (Resistance and Liberation Movements in Transition). The project’s overall aim was to learn 
from the experience of those in resistance or liberation movements who have used violence in their struggle 
but have also engaged politically during the conflict and in any peace process. Recent experience around the 
world has demonstrated that reaching political settlement in protracted social conflict always eventually 
needs the involvement of such movements. Our aim here was to discover how, from a non-state perspective, 
such political development is handled, what is the relationship between political and military strategies and 
tactics, and to learn more about how such movements (often sweepingly and simplistically bundled under the 
label of non-state armed groups) contribute to the transformation of conflict and to peacemaking. We aimed 
then to use that experiential knowledge (1) to offer support to other movements who might be considering 
such a shift of strategy, and (2) to help other actors (states and international) to understand more clearly how 
to engage meaningfully with such movements to bring about political progress and peaceful settlement. 
 Political violence is a tool of both state and non-state actors, and replacing it by political methods 
of conflict management is essential to making sustainable peace. With this project we wanted 
to understand better how one side of that equation has been, or could be, achieved. Depending 
on the particular case, each study makes a strong argument for the necessary inclusion of the 
movement in any future settlement, or documents clearly how such a role was effectively executed. 
 We consciously asked participants to reflect on these movements’  experience from their own unique 
point of view. What we publish in this series is not presented as neutral or exclusively accurate commentary. 
All histories are biased histories, and there is no single truth in conflict or in peace. Rather, we believe these 
case-studies are significant because they reflect important voices which are usually excluded or devalued in 
the analysis of conflict. Increasing numbers of academics, for example, study “armed groups” from outside, 
but few actually engage directly with them to hear their own points of view, rationales and understandings 
of their context. We are convinced that these opinions and perspectives urgently need to be heard in order 
to broaden our understanding of peacemaking. For exactly this reason, each case study has been produced 
with the very close co-operation of, and in some cases authored by, members of the movement concerned. 
As the results amply illustrate, these perspectives are sophisticated, intelligent, political and strategic. 
 The reader may or may not agree with the perspectives expressed. But, much more importantly, we 
hope that the reader will accept that these perspectives are valid in themselves and must be included in 
any attempt at comprehensive understanding of violent conflict and its transformation. We urgently need 
to understand in more depth the dynamics of organisations who make the transition between political 
violence and democratic politics, in order to improve our understanding of their role, and our practice, in 
making peace.
 The views expressed are those of the authors and contributors, and do not necessarily reflect the 
opinions or views of the Berghof Foundation.
For further information on the series, please contact the editor:
    
Dr. Véronique Dudouet (Programme Director)  
v.dudouet@berghof-foundation.org    
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Introduction
This report does not attempt to offer an exhaustive history of Kurdistan and the Kurds. Primarily focussing 
on the Turkish-occupied part of Kurdistan (recent developments in Syrian-occupied Kurdistan are 
described in Annex III), it sketches the evolution of the Kurdish people’s struggle for basic human rights 
and freedoms, as well as their right to self-determination, and especially their various attempts to reach a 
political solution. 
Richly endowed with natural resources, and situated on the silk and spice routes used by Asian, 
European and African traders, Mesopotamia became the birthplace of many Middle Eastern religions and 
civilisations. Due to its central location in Mesopotamia, Kurdistan has been raided and exploited throughout 
history by external powers seeking to dominate the region and subjugate its people. The current impasse 
is rooted in developments in 19th-century Anatolia and Mesopotamia. England, the hegemonic power of 
capitalist modernity, considered these regions to be strategically important for controlling the Middle East, 
Caucasia, Central Asia and India, and Western powers have acted to maintain the anti-democratic policies 
of the region’s sovereign states (such as Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria) ever since. The unresolved ‘Kurdish 
question’ is closely tied to the interests of global powers, and as such is as much the problem of England, 
the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) as of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and the region. In short, 
the Kurdish question is an international problem.
Because Kurds have always lived under the sway of others, they have had difficulty establishing the 
internal dynamics and motivation required for self-administration. The result has been a lack of societal 
unity and religious ideologies that sometimes conflict with one another – which explains the Kurdish 
people’s vicious cycle of dividedness, external reliance, inner conflict and subdivision into even smaller 
pieces. Over the past 200 years, many uprisings have attempted to break this cycle. None has succeeded, 
mostly because of a failure to extend beyond the immediate surroundings and form a cohesive approach 
encompassing the historical realities of the region. Some uprisings were provoked by outside forces, and 
all were followed by massacres by the Turkish state. The 1936 uprising in Dersim is a case in point.1 
This cycle of rebellions eventually led to the establishment of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya 
Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK), under the leadership Abdullah Öcalan, aimed at waging a struggle which 
“encompasses history, the present and the future” (Öcalan 2004). The PKK’s main dynamic of change is 
the perspective that ‘joint existence’ is crucial for success. Kurds will not be able to come “into [their] 
own” by insisting on the old approaches (Öcalan 2004). The Kurds’ current circumstances conflict with 
Kurdish society’s natural fabric: the organisation and construction of any society is not only about a 
political framework but also its moral, social and democratic components. Along with seeking a political 
solution to the Kurdish question, the PKK believes that an even more important struggle must be waged – 
to construct a democratic society. Their view is not that “we are going to see [the] beautiful and free days” 
of socialist jargon, but rather that “without postponing freedom to tomorrow” we must aim for it today.  
The main objective of this report is to explain the emergence and internal evolution of the PKK 
within the Kurdish struggle for freedom and democracy against the repressive and nationalist policies of 
the Turkish state. It is based on face-to-face interviews with people who hold executive positions in the 
Kurdish movement, as well as books and media statements by Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan and other 
1  In the 1937–1938 Dersim Massacre, part of a military campaign against the Dersim Rebellion of 1936 that was launched to 
protest Turkey’s Resettlement Law of 1934, thousands of Alevi and Zaza Kurds died and many others were internally displaced. The 
city of Dersim (‘silver gate’) was renamed ‘Tunceli’ (Turkish for ‘iron fist’) and the surrounding region was massively depopulated. 
On 23 November 2011, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan apologised for “one of the most tragic events of our recent 
history” (BBC News 2011).
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representatives. My 25 years’ experience with the subject helps me make use of news items, articles and 
op-eds published in Kurdish, as well as Turkish and international media outlets.
This report has three main parts. The first part (sections 1 and 2) examines Kurdish history and the 
bipolar (West/East) political and military balance of power in which the Kurdish movement developed. The 
second part (sections 3, 4 and 5) addresses the global changes of the 1990s and their impact on the Kurdish 
movement, as well as successive periods of peaceful efforts and renewed confrontation. The final part 
(sections 6 and 7) addresses the period that began with the official ‘Oslo Meetings’ between the Turkish 
state and the PKK in 2007, and ends with the latest ‘İmralı peace process’ in 2013.
1  A short history of the Kurds – from 
the Neolithic Age to the 1970s
The Kurdish people hail from the plateau and plains between the Zagros–Taurus Mountains and the 
Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, and have been known by various names since the Neolithic revolution (c. 
10,000 BC). At the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) PKK-leader Öcalan argued that the Kurdish 
people constantly have had to defend themselves from hostilities inflicted on them and their geography 
(Eren 2012). Yet despite showing their strength by resisting, the Kurds also have always tended to 
live alongside other peoples. Since the time of the Sumerians, they have co-existed with Babylonians, 
Assyrians, Urartians, Persians, Hellenics, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Iranians and Turks – in various 
feudal and tyrannical empires.  
In 1639, Kurdistan’s land mass of 550,000 km2 was divided into two by the Qasr-e-Shirin Treaty between 
the Ottoman Empire and the Iranian Safavid Empire. In 1923, after the Ottoman Empire collapsed, it was 
cut into four parts through a treaty signed in Lausanne by the newly formed Republic of Turkey and the 
victors of the First World War.2 Unofficially, 20 million Kurds live in Northern Kurdistan (Turkey), 10 million 
in Eastern Kurdistan (Iran), 7 million in Southern Kurdistan (Iraq) and 2.5 million in Western Kurdistan 
(Syria) – with approximately 2 million Kurds more scattered across the globe. This means that there are 
almost 40 million Kurds worldwide. 
Geographically, the land of the Kurds is broadly defined as the area between Mount Ararat and Lake 
Urmia in the north and east, and the land between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers – extending south 
through the Zagros Mountains to Lower Mesopotamia. The Kurdish language belongs to the Indo-Iranian 
branch of Indo-European languages. Currently it is spoken between Anatolia, Caucasia, Persia and Arabia. 
Historically, Kurdish people have been called names that refer to various ethnic groups and languages 
–‘Kurtioi’, ‘Kurtie’, ‘Korticaykh’, ‘Korduh’, ‘Kordia’, ‘Bakurda’, ‘Korduene’, ‘Kardu’, ‘Karday’ and ‘Karda’. 
While at first, these names denoted separate clans, they now refer to an ethnic entity that includes all the 
clans of Kurdistan (Baran 2007).
This first section presents the socio-cultural, historical and political background to the Kurdish 
struggle, from its prehistoric origins until the 1970s. 
2  The Lausanne Treaty was greeted by the Turks as it offered them an international guarantee for a sovereign Turkish state, while 
for the Kurds it represented an “institutionalization of slavery and colonialism” (Besikci 1990: 21).
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1.1  The Proto-Kurds’ social structure and struggle to survive 
Given their geopolitical and sociocultural circumstances, Mesopotamian people have tended to use 
institutional unity as a defence against central authority. This has helped them to preserve their identity, 
with all its riches and contradictions, to this very day. The ethnic entities squeezed between the Hittite 
Empire and the Babylon–Assyrian Empire developed into powerful tribes. In 3,000 BC, the Sumerians 
called the ancestors of the Proto-Kurds who had developed a distinct ethnic awareness, ‘Horrit’ or ‘Hurri’ 
(people from the mountains). These mountain people also represented the parts of society who resisted 
being subjugated by central authority. The Hurrians maintained good relations with the Hittites and other 
ethnic groups in the region, and were the first to transmit the Sumerian, Babylonian and Assyrian cultures 
to the north and east through trade. ‘Gutians’, ‘Kassites’, ‘Mitannis’, ‘Urartians’ and ‘Medes’ (all descendants 
of the Hurrians) had strong bonds.
Instead of forming distinct entities, these clans preferred to live with their neighbours – and still 
do today. After the demise of the Hurrians, the Mitannis formed a stronger confederation between 1500 
BC and 1250 BC. However, their perennial conflicts with the Hittites and Assyrians led to their political 
extinction under the Assyrian Emperor Salamanassar. In one of the fortuitous ironies of history, in 612 BC, 
the Medes, descendants of the Hurrians, defeated the Assyrian Empire, and then protected themselves 
from imperialist empires through a system of state governors, unifications and coalitions. Organised into 
semi-federal tribal entities, the Medes survived the Macedonians, the Roman Empire, and Parthian and 
Sasanian rule – until the invasion of Alexander the Great.  
1.2  Turkish-Kurdish relations in the Ottoman Empire
In the Middle Ages, especially after the Middle East had been islamised, the Kurds were subjugated in turn 
by the Safavids, Umayyads and Abbasids, but continued to exist as autonomous or independent entities. In 
the 10th and 11th centuries, the Kurds were organised into various states, including the ‘Mervani’ confederacy 
and ‘Seddadi’ dynasty. Leaving Central Asia, the Turks moved through Mesopotamia, reaching Anatolia in 
the 11th century, establishing the first relations with Kurdish tribes, which developed into the first ‘Seljuk’ 
state. The Kurds allied themselves with the Turks and they fought side by side in the Battle of Manzikert in 
1071, the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514 (when the Ottomans defeated the Persian Safavids and gained control 
over eastern Anatolia), and the Battle of Mercidabik in 1516 (when the Ottomans were victorious over the 
Mamluks). Until the 19th century and the decline of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish-Kurdish relations were 
based on alliances and partnerships. 
1.3  Persecution and uprisings since the 19th century
In the 19th century, Kurdish landlords3 were the local authorities who conducted administrative, legal and 
economic affairs independent of the central authority. Their external affairs, however, were managed by 
the Ottoman Empire.
Threatened with decline in the early 19th century, the Ottoman Empire became more centralised. The 
local authorities – Kurdish squires – were replaced by centrally appointed governors, sent to the region 
just to collect taxes and draft soldiers. These measures sparked numerous Kurdish revolts, such as the 
Babanzade uprising in 1806, the Revanduz uprising in 1834–1835, the Nehirli Seyh Ubeydullah uprising in 
3  Kurdish landlords represented landowners and aristocratic families. If they needed to protect their interests and maneuvering 
space, they would fight. Without a Kurdish liberation movement, they were the de facto representatives of the Kurdish people. The 
allegiance of certain tribes gave the landlords military strength to resist the central authority, and although their uprisings were 
usually confined to their localities, they left an important legacy for the modern Kurdish movement.   
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1880 and the Mustafa Barzani revolt in 1961. More than 30 uprisings took place (Birand 2008), all of which 
failed to extend beyond their immediate localities.
The Armistice of Mudros signed in 1918 between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain (representing 
the First World War Allies) put an end to the Ottoman Empire. Kurdish cities were occupied by the various 
powers who dominated the region – Turkey, Great Britain, France and Russia. Earlier that year, US President 
Woodrow Wilson had announced a 14-point programme for world peace, and emphasised the need for self-
determination of the various nationalities in the Ottoman Empire. Galvanised by his statement, Kurds rallied 
in many Kurdish cities, and formed organisations to inform the Western states that the Kurdish question was 
awaiting a solution. However, neither the US nor any of the European states showed any interest.
In 1919, Mustafa Kemal launched a national liberation movement to prevent Turkey being occupied 
after the break up of the Ottoman Empire. He strove to rally the Kurds by invoking Turkish–Kurdish 
fraternity and holding congresses in the Kurdish cities of Erzurum and Sivas. The Kurds were inspired 
by Kemal’s claim that “[T]he Kurds and Turks are inseparable brothers and this homeland is the joint 
homeland of these two constituent peoples” (Ciwanazad 2008). They accepted his invitation and fought 
with him, believing that once Turkey and Kurdistan were protected from foreign occupation, their Kurdish 
rights would be acknowledged in one common state. During this period, Kemal stated in many speeches 
that the Kurdish national and social existence would be accepted and developed.
With the help of the Kurds, the national liberation struggle was won: the Turkish Republic was 
proclaimed in 1923. However, the new state went on to annul all its promises and agreements with the 
Kurds and instead massacred Kurdish people. The Kurdish opposition was bloodily suppressed and Kurds 
were unable to assume their rightful position on the world stage. The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 divided 
the Kurdish homeland into four parts that were placed under the sovereignty of other powers, a situation 
that continues today. 
Targeting Kurdistan was of great interest for Western European states as well. Since the 19th century, 
the geographic position and underground riches of the Mosul-Kirkuk region (in present-day Iraq) had 
attracted outsiders. After World War I, it came into the sights of England and France (Karankik 2006). 
Kemal was forced to assert control of either the Turkish Republic or Mosul-Kirkuk – claiming both would 
have meant risking a war with the Great Powers, and he was too much of a realist to take that chance. 
History has since witnessed the Kurds’ tragedy: for the Turkish Republic to survive, Mosul-Kirkuk had to be 
ceded to England, but abandoning the region dealt a mortal blow to the Kurds. The Turkish Republic and 
England sacrificed the Kurds for their interests.
This modern tragedy, which began in 1925 with the first Kurdish uprising led by Sheikh Said (and 
resulted in the former Ottoman province of Mosul being assigned to the British Mandate of Mesopotamia), 
was to continue and become increasingly serious. Under Kemal’s successor, Ismet Inönü, then in the Turkish 
Republic of the 1950s, Kurdish reality was a taboo subject. The Kurds’ national project was ravaged before it 
could flower. It was not bad enough that Kurdistan was separated into four parts: the anti-Kurdish policies 
implemented in each of the four new states were worse than in the others. After 1925, the Kurds’ national 
reality can be characterised as a period of genocide – ‘colonialism’ does not adequately describe the policy of 
annihilation. Threatened with extinction until the 1970s, the Kurdish nation’s first priority was not attaining 
freedom, but rather surviving. Those long decades of military occupation, assimilation and threatened 
annihilation must be seen as a concerted effort to deprive Kurds of any national identity (Öcalan 1999).
The Republic of Turkey wanted to assure quiet in Kurdistan. To that end, Kurdistan was dotted with 
gallows, and villages, towns and cities were bombed and burnt. In order to destroy Kurdish identity, 
Kurdish villagers were exiled to cities in the west of Turkey, and Turks were settled in Kurdish cities and 
towns. The Plan for Eastern Restoration/Rehabilitation4 and the Law for the Maintenance of Public Order5 
4  Şark Islahat Planı (passed by the Turkish Grand Assembly on 8 September 1925, giving the Government permission to take 
strict measures against ‘the East’, meaning the Kurds)
5  Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu (passed by the Turkish Grand Assembly on 3 March 1925, giving the Government extraordinary powers)
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of 1925 and the Resettlement Law of 1934,6 made this official. The names of Kurdish towns and villages were 
‘turkified’: Kurdistan ceased to exist on a map. The Kurdish language was outlawed, including the three 
letters that are not part of the Turkish alphabet. These horrific policies conspired to suppress all mention of 
the Kurds until the 1970s. The Turkish state did its best to insure total silence, and believed that everything 
had been sorted out.
2  The PKK’s military and political 
struggle with the Turkish state
The World War II defeat of fascist states by democratic forces created a favourable atmosphere for national 
liberation movements in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.  Classic colonialist systems suffered blows 
that led to their dissolution and many people were liberated. Then ‘neo-colonialism’ replaced classic 
colonialism and the United States took England’s place; the British left Iraq and the French left Syria, 
leaving the administration of both countries to the Arabs. These developments affected Kurdistan.
The global political context of the late 1960s also affected Turkey. While youth movements were 
developing around the world, leftist youth in Turkey began to rally around the demand for an ‘independent 
and democratic Turkey’. Leaders spoke about the Kurdish people and their rights, emphasising Turkish-
Kurdish fraternity. But many young leaders were massacred by the Turkish army, imprisoned or even 
sentenced to capital punishment; the Turkish Left was decimated. However, with time, the socialist-left 
wave in Turkey also captured the imagination of Kurdish youth who, as a result of their socio-economic 
analysis of Kurdistan, began to organise their own national liberation movement.
In 1978, the PKK was founded as a Kurdish movement that adopted the legacy of the massacred 
revolutionaries of the Turkish Left. Based on Marxist-Leninist theory and the strategy of a long-term 
‘people’s war’, it aimed at achieving an ‘independent Kurdistan’. The Turkish Republic’s homogenising 
and monopolising nation-state system was contrary to PKK views. It used the Constitution, educational 
system, legal system and media – and when necessary, military violence – to insist that only ‘Turks’ live 
in Turkey. Kurds were referred to as ‘Mountain Turks’. Soon a merciless war against the PKK was started. 
This section covers the establishment of the PKK in 1973, its campaign for the self-determination of the 
Kurdish people and the repressive reaction of the Turkish state until the early 1990s. 
2.1  The rise of the PKK and its armed struggle 
The PKK began with a group of young activists in Ankara led by theoretician Abdullah Öcalan who were first 
known as the ‘Apoists’ (from ‘Apo’, or ‘uncle’, Öcalan’s nickname). In March 1973, the group’s structure began 
to be formalised, and by 1975–1976, its influence had spread across Turkish Kurdistan. Its tremendous success 
in such a short time indicated how much Kurdish society thirsted for freedom: the notion of freedom resonated 
with people of the region, especially the youth. The PKK was officially founded on 27 November 1978, largely 
because its cadres believed that all legal ways of organising a national movement had been exhausted, 
6  Mecburi Iskan Kanunu (‘Mandatory Law of Caving and Placement’ from 14 June 1934)
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leaving only armed resistance to combat the colonialist powers. They felt that only an all-encompassing 
revolution could enable the threatened Kurdish identity to flourish. The PKK declared that legal struggle 
was impossible in a country that thoroughly denied Kurdish identity: only armed struggle could successfully 
resist its annihilation. The PKK aimed to create a new Kurdish society through a popular uprising. 
2.2  The Turkish state’s approach to the PKK
The Turkish state responded to the international leftist youth movements of 1968 and the PKK-led Kurdistan 
independence movement by staging a military coup on 12 September 1980. Shortly before the coup, PKK 
General Secretary Öcalan had fled through Syria to a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon, but most PKK 
cadres in Turkey were captured and sent to the military prison in Diyarbakir. News of the cadres’ torture 
and persecution and their subsequent struggles, as well as preparations for guerrilla warfare under Öcalan, 
ensured mass support for the PKK (Öcalan 2004). The demands of the imprisoned cadres in Diyarbakir led 
to the PKK’s first military operation: on 15 August 1984 guerrilla units infiltrated all the Kurdish provinces 
in Turkey. Popular support for the PKK grew gradually in northern Kurdistan because of Turkey’s denial 
and annihilation policies against the Kurds. Many people joined the PKK guerrilla, which they considered 
a legitimate defence force against Turkish repression.
At first, the Turkish state did not take these attacks seriously, announcing that the perpetrators would 
be dealt with quickly. Finally recognising in 1987 that it was confronted with a struggle that was broadly 
supported by the Kurds, Turkey declared a state of emergency. All powers were vested in a ‘super’ regional 
governor, which meant that the struggle was delegated from the state to the Turkish Armed Forces. With 
full authority, the governors waged a vicious war, introducing special tactics such as extra-judicial killings 
and the deployment of paramilitary ‘village guards’.7 Turkey also sought foreign allies for its dirty war, 
using counter-insurgency methods learnt abroad to fight the Kurds. 
2.3  The Kurdish people’s legal political struggle and the military  
operations of the Turkish Armed Forces 
The Turkish state policies of denial and annihilation were unable to defeat the PKK; on the contrary, mass 
support grew for the PKK, with the struggle waged not just by the guerrillas but also by people in the street. 
The most extraordinary examples of this were the (forbidden) mass celebrations of the Kurdish New Year, 
or ‘Newroz’.8 In the 1990s all public celebrations were banned, and the Turkish army attacked people who 
gathered without permission, killing hundreds. Yet the Kurds overcame their fear of the Turkish state and 
continued to celebrate Newroz each year.  
The Kurdish struggle also reached the political realm. In 1989, in a defining moment, Kurdish Members 
of Parliament (MPs) Ahmet Türk, Adnan Ekmen, Mahmut Alınak and Salih Sümer were expelled from the 
Social Democratic People’s Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkeı Parti, SHP) for attending a Kurdish conference 
in Paris. The next year, the same MPs formed a new political party called the People’s Labour Party (Halkın 
Emek Partisi, HEP) and in 1991, for the first time, 18 members of the pro-Kurdish HEP were elected to the 
Turkish Parliament. Among them was Leyla Zana, who later received the Sakharov Prize from the European 
7  Some 90,000 Kurdish villagers were first paid and provided with arms to defend their villages, then were used by the Turkish 
army to carry out domestic and cross-border military operations. Some of these ‘village guards’ are now being tried for their crimes. 
Village guards were used by the state for approximately 17,000 extra-judicial killings.
8  According to the legend in the Middle East, Newroz (‘new day’) symbolises the resistance and liberation of the blacksmith Kawa 
against the brutality of the tyrant Dehag – representing the liberation of subjugated people (Ayman 2013).
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Parliament. The HEP was outlawed by the Constitutional Court in 1993 (Fendoğlu 2011)9; its MPs’ diplomatic 
immunity was revoked the year after. While Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Selim Sadak and Orhan Doğan were 
sent to prison the other HEP MPs fled to Europe, where they were granted political asylum and formed the 
Kurdistan Parliament in Exile (PKDW). With Kurds in Europe organising mass rallies, demonstrations and 
international conferences, support for the Kurdish people reached new heights.  
The combined efforts of the people’s uprisings in Northern Kurdistan (Turkey), the diplomatic 
initiatives of Kurds in Europe and the influx of guerrilla fighters and their new offensives all threatened 
the Turkish state, which reacted by staging major military operations in the guerrilla strongholds of Botan, 
Dersim, Amed (Diyarbakir) and Serhat (the largest Kurdish cities in Northern Kurdistan). Since 1991, the 
Turkish state has also flaunted international law by carrying out cross-border military operations at the 
border of Turkey, Iran and Iraq. Such operations have generally been carried out two or three times a year 
– using tens of thousands of soldiers, village guards and counter-insurgents. Each operation costs Turkish 
citizens millions of dollars. 
All kinds of weapons have been used against the guerrillas, including chemical weapons, which allegedly 
are still being used (Steinvorth and Musharbash 2010). Marks and scars indicative of chemical weapons have 
been found on guerrillas’ corpses.10 Similar violence has been and continues to be used against the civilian 
population. It is estimated that since the beginning of the armed struggle in the 1980s, more than 40,000 
people have lost their lives, with 17,000 people ‘disappeared’ in custody or assassinated by state agencies in 
extra-judicial killings. These crimes remain unresolved. In November 2011, 120 mass graves containing the 
remains of civilians and guerrilla combatants were discovered (Kurdish Human Rights Project 2011).
The Turkish state has attempted to isolate the guerrillas by forcing the Kurds to emigrate.  Between 
2,000 and 4,000 villages have been forcefully evacuated by security forces since the beginning of the 
armed struggle; some 3 to 3.5 million people are internally displaced. Villagers who are forced to move to 
urban centres face severe economic and social challenges and limited political will to assist them (Kurdish 
Human Rights Project 2011).
3  The pursuit of dialogue and the 
international conspiracy against 
Öcalan
After thousands had died, the two sides realised that they could not win by using violent means and 
began to search for political approaches. Confident of his massive political backing, PKK General Secretary 
Öcalan began to reorient his movement both structurally and strategically (as will be further described in 
the next section). Meanwhile, certain Turkish government circles began to seek a negotiated solution. This 
9  This policy continues today: 27 parties have been banned because of the Kurdish question. But each banned Kurdish party is 
replaced by a new one.
10  For instance, the Turkish army is alleged to have used chemical weapons in the Kazan Valley (Geliyê Tiyarê) where 36 
combatants were killed in clashes in the Çukurca district of Hakkari on October 22-24, 2011. Online at www.kurdishinfo.com/
turkish-army-claims-they-didnt-use-chemical-weapon-in-kazan-valley.
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section describes the intermittent dialogues between the PKK and the Turkish state in the period 1993–
2004, marked notably by Öcalan’s kidnapping and imprisonment in 1999, and how the post-11-September 
2001 ‘war-on-terror’ rhetoric has impacted the state’s attitude towards the Kurdish conflict.
3.1  The beginning of the PKK’s transition and the 1993 ceasefire
Changes within the PKK began with Öcalan’s political messages in 1993, and became official with the 
report he presented at the PKK’s Fifth Congress from 8 to 27 January 1995. At the same time, circles within 
the Turkish state began to seek paths for dialogue. President Turgut Özal sent a message to Öcalan, and in 
response, the PKK declared its first unilateral ceasefire at a press conference in the Lebanese town of Bar 
Elias on 20 March 1993 (CNNTURK 2010). For one month, both sides stopped all hostilities: not a single 
shot was fired. The Turkish and Kurdish people greeted this lull with relief. Then Öcalan held another 
press conference to extend the ceasefire, explaining why the PKK had taken up arms in the first place, 
the mountain guerrillas’ ambition and how the struggle should be conducted in the future. Given the 
significance of his speech, it is worth citing at length: 
First of all, this process of ceasing fire has led to historical consequences; the ceasefire has started a 
new era. What is asked of us is to deepen this process. There is no doubt that our responsibilities are 
great. The Kurdish people are going through their roughest period in history. The Kurdish people have 
been subjected to persecution that has resulted in genocide and more. We never just took up arms for 
the sake of it. All we did was to open a road for our nation to freely develop. But we had no other 
means of struggle to adopt: that is why we had to take up arms and have brought the struggle to this 
stage. The Kurdish situation is, at heart, a Turkish-Kurdish situation. Our struggle has come to the 
point of the Turkish public accepting the Kurdish identity; it has seen it necessary to recognise Kurdish 
existence and solve the problem. [...]
We all support the development of this process. We hereby announce that with certain conditions the 
limited ceasefire could be made indefinite. These conditions are as follows: primarily, the ceasefire cannot 
be one-sided. All military operations should be ceased. The intense persecution of the people, arrests and 
extra-judicial killings must stop. If military operations persist, whether in three days or three months, 
we will have no choice but to effectively defend ourselves. This is the first point I would like to make. The 
government has some requests regarding the guerrillas coming down from the mountains. Our forces in the 
mountains have taken all possible risks to attain our political ambitions. They are there in support of our 
national existence and an honourable solution. If these ambitions are fulfilled, if our basic requirements 
are honestly fulfilled and the proper circumstances are arranged, then the problem of the armed guerrillas 
will be dealt with very easily. In this sense there is no problem with the guerrillas. Secondly, we have some 
immediate requests regarding the ceasefire process. I spoke of the cessation of all military operations. This 
goes not only for the guerrillas, but for the people in general. The third is a general amnesty. We do not see 
ourselves as guilty people, and expect all political prisoners to be freed. Of course we also expect certain 
cultural rights to be put in to practice. These are rights to a free press and media, Kurdish radio, television, 
newspaper and books, etc.    
In short, the Kurdish language should be freed. We demand that the people who have been forced out 
of their villages be able to return and be compensated. We expect the state of emergency in the region to be 
lifted and the village guards to be disbanded. To pave the way to a solution, we declare a general amnesty 
for the village guards. This means that if they abandon their arms we will not touch them. All Kurdish 
organisations should be legalised. We demand the right to political association and organisation. In short, 
these are our expectations that will ensure a calmer, more peaceful atmosphere. 
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A further step that needs to be taken is the constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity. All the 
above-mentioned points pave the way for a democratic federation. We would like these sorts of debates to 
be carried out with mutual respect.11
While these demands were still being enthusiastically discussed in public, Turkish President Turgut 
Özal suddenly died. Everyone, including his family, believes that he was poisoned (Seibert 2012).12 At a 
meeting of the Turkish-American Businessmen Council, Stephen Kinzer of the New York Times stated 
that he had suspicions regarding Özal’s death (Kinzer 2001). Forces in Turkey that were hostile to peace 
killed President Özal to reignite the war. After his death, the Turkish Armed Forces restarted their military 
operations against the guerrillas, then the PKK killed 33 soldiers – and the negotiations were ended.13 
Military operations escalated: the war was rekindled. 
With Öcalan continuing to insist on changing policy, the PKK declared eight unilateral ceasefires 
in 1993, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2005, 2006, 2009 and 2010. Unfortunately, none of these ceasefires led to a 
durable peace. Instead, the Turkish state viewed them as signs of weakness and responded to them with 
conspiracies and provocations. 
3.2  The PKK’s unilateral ceasefires of 1995 and 1998  
Following the end of the 1993 ceasefire, Turkey developed a new concept of war against the PKK by seeking 
diplomatic backing from the USA and Britain through the ‘Dublin Process’ (Serxwebun 1995), and military 
backing from Kurdish organisations in Iraq, namely, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK). But before the new concept was announced, in August 1995 the KDP and the PKK 
began hostilities that were to last three months. 
This war was ended by a mutual ceasefire on 11 December 1995. Öcalan did not want to limit this 
ceasefire to the two Kurdish parties, and attempting to open a path for a political solution to the Kurdish 
question, declared that their ceasefire was intended to also stop Turkish state operations. Regrettably, 
his attempt was in vain and attacks against the Kurdish people continued at full pace. In spring 1996 the 
Turkish state launched an extensive military operation throughout Kurdistan – demonstrating its total 
disregard for the PKK ceasefire. On 6 May 1996, a commando ordered by then-Turkish Prime Minister Tansu 
Çiller tried to assassinate Öcalan in a house in Syria – but he was not at home. After such a provocation, 
the PKK resumed hostilities. 
On 1 September 1998, the PKK declared its third unilateral ceasefire. Later it was understood that many 
circles in Turkey had been in dialogue with the PKK – indirectly. The Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin 
Erbakan and the commander of the Turkish Armed Forces had requested that the PKK declare a ceasefire, 
and the Turkish government had indirectly informed the PKK about a mechanism for administering the 
peace process and said that the people should be prepared for peace. However, this positive atmosphere 
was short-lived: it was immediately followed by an international conspiracy to capture Öcalan.
11   Online at www.serxwebun.org/arsiv/136/
12  “Rumours that Ozal was murdered, possibly from members of the state security forces who resisted his efforts to find a 
peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem, have lingered for years. Media reports have said that shortly before his death, Mr Ozal 
opposed the adoption of a counter-guerrilla strategy by the state, including the deployment of right-wing hit men, to hunt down 
leaders and alleged sympathisers of Kurdish rebels” (Seibert 2012).
13  The killing of these soldiers has always been a contentious matter: Öcalan himself, as well as certain advocates of peace in 
Turkey, have requested an independent inquiry into the incident. Many believe that Turkish soldiers reported their comrades’ route 
to the PKK because they wanted the conflict to continue.
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3.3  The conspiracy against Öcalan and his subsequent arrest and 
resistance
Although the PKK continued to insist on talks, the Turkish state never truly believed in bilateral political 
dialogue, and used every opportunity to attempt to eliminate PKK members. Extra-judicial killings carried 
out by the Turkish state between 1990 and 199914 aimed to incite the PKK to spread the war to Turkish cities. 
The Kurdish people generally supported Öcalan’s policies, but from time to time they criticised the PKK 
leadership for not further escalating the war. Despite the pressure, Öcalan continued to pursue a political 
solution and declared four more unilateral ceasefires before 1999. The Turkish state viewed these ceasefires 
as signs of weakness and defeat, and escalated its military operations against the PKK. With political and 
military support from EU states and the USA, Turkey pressured Syria to force Öcalan to leave the country. In 
1998, First Army Commander General Atilla Ateş made a fiery speech at the Syrian border. With American 
and Israeli warships offshore, it appeared that Turkey was preparing to go to war against Syria (Bila 2010). 
Believing that these manoeuvres were in protest at Öcalan’s residence in Syria, the Syrian government 
asked him to leave the country. As he later explained, Öcalan decided to leave Syria to spare the country 
being victimised because of him and to search elsewhere for a political solution to the Kurdish question. 
On 9 October 1998, Öcalan began a four-month odyssey through Russia, Italy, Greece and Kenya, where he 
was finally kidnapped and handed over to Turkey: the “fate of the Kurds of the past few centuries was […] 
relived” (Rojbas 2011).
Many observers expected that if Öcalan was captured, the Kurdish movement would suffer a major 
blow and its struggle would wither away. Then-US Secretary of State Madeline Albright addressed the US 
Senate, calling on the countries that had welcomed Öcalan to put him on trial (US Senate 1999). After 
Öcalan’s capture, she had to admit her surprise at the Kurdish people’s hefty reaction to her words: 
apparently those who had sought Albright’s support had not briefed her on Öcalan’s significance. The 
Kurdish struggle did not let up and nobody surrendered; on the contrary, the Kurdish people demonstrated 
unprecedented defiance. The slogan “You Cannot Eclipse Our Sun” served to strengthen the resistance and 
support their leader, Öcalan. For some weeks, demonstrations were held daily, along with hunger strikes. 
Many Kurds set themselves committed acts of self-immolation, including mothers and a 10-year-old girl in 
eastern Kurdistan, despite calls from Öcalan and the PKK to stop.
A few Greek MPs had met Öcalan in Syria and invited him to Greece. However, on 9 October 1998, 
Öcalan was refused entry there. He then went to Moscow where he stayed for a month. During this time, 
Turkey offered Russian Prime Minister Primakov a deal: Turkey would not meddle in any Russian affairs if 
Russia stopped meddling in Turkey’s Kurdish question and stopped helping Öcalan. Primakov agreed, and 
ignoring the Russian Parliament’s invitation to Öcalan when he was still in Syria, began to assist Turkey. 
Öcalan realised that he had to leave Moscow, and went to Rome.
European states did not want Öcalan to stay in Europe because of Turkey’s geopolitical status and 
their military, political and economic relations. Öcalan’s application for political asylum was accepted 
by the Italian authorities, but never made official. Tens of thousands of Kurdish people camped in Rome 
in freezing weather to demand permission for Öcalan to stay and for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish 
question. In Rome, Öcalan made various statements declaring that he was ready for a peaceful solution 
to the Kurdish question and that European states should play an active part in promoting and supervising 
a peace process. However, the Europeans had decided that they wanted Öcalan to leave and started to 
pressure Italy to this end. When Öcalan saw that he was not being accorded the protection usually accorded 
political refugees, he decided to leave Italy. On 16 January 1999, on the basis of certain assurances, Öcalan 
returned to Moscow. But once again, he was not allowed to stay in Russia: on 29 January he left for Athens.
14  Attacks carried out by state-sponsored counter-guerrilla forces (under various names) claimed the lives of 17,000 civilian Kurds 
including women, children, businessmen, intellectuals, journalists, academics and non-PKK-militia members.
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The Greek government had just one wish: for Öcalan to leave the country. They convinced him that it was 
not safe for him to remain there, and announced that they were making preparations for him in South 
Africa. A small jet was readied in Corfu and the flight to Africa took off. Onboard, Öcalan was informed 
that he was being flown to Kenya. On 1 February 1999, he was brought to a house in Nairobi belonging to 
the Greek Embassy. At Greece’s request, a delegation consisting of the Kenyan president’s son, members 
of the secret service and officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were in constant contact with Öcalan. 
On 15 February, the Greek Embassy told Öcalan that everything was ready for him to go to The Netherlands 
and made assurances that he would be safe there. While Öcalan reluctantly accepted, believing the Greek 
government’s promise, their spokesperson issued a statement that “Öcalan had left the house of the Greek 
Embassy on his own accord”. Öcalan was escorted to one car and the rest of his party to the car behind it. 
However, Kenyan officials and secret services separated Öcalan’s car and drove him straight to the airport, 
where they handed him over to Turkish secret service agents and officials of the Turkish Armed Forces who 
were waiting aboard a plane.
The world had united to conspire against Öcalan. For days he had roamed the skies, was refused 
asylum, and in defiance of the norms of international humanitarian law, he was handed to Turkish state 
officials, who imprisoned and isolated him in a jail of his own on İmralı Island.15
3.4  Meetings with Öcalan in prison
At the time of Öcalan’s arrest, the PKK was holding its Sixth Congress. It decided not to choose a new 
leader, declaring that “rather than disregard our imprisoned leader, we will embrace him even more 
than before”. Kurdish people’s anger at the international conspiracy inspired them to hold daily mass 
protests (demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, meetings, hunger strikes, etc.) in Turkish and European cities 
to demonstrate their support for and allegiance to Öcalan. There was even talk of a Turkish–Kurdish war. 
To diffuse the situation, the Turkish state retreated slightly: officials met with Öcalan in prison and stated 
that if he would calm the protests, they would take some positive steps. Öcalan later told the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) that he had accepted the state’s offer in order to avoid a Turkish-Kurdish 
conflict and create the proper foundation for the transition and reconstruction he envisioned. He called for 
protests to end. The atmosphere calmed and a new era began.
On 2 August 1999, the PKK declared that it would withdraw its forces from Turkey; it did so on 1 
September 1999. The following month, in a separate show of goodwill, again following a suggestion 
from Öcalan, the PKK sent two ‘peace groups’ to Turkey, one from the mountains in Southern Kurdistan 
(Northern Iraq) and one from Europe. Unfortunately, these goodwill gestures went unheeded. The entire 
guerrilla group that went to Turkey was immediately arrested and each member sentenced to a minimum 
of 10 years. One of them died in prison. The members of the group from Europe were all given prison 
sentences of 15 years. Some of them are still imprisoned. 
Despite these developments, Öcalan continued to seek a paradigm shift and to reconstruct the PKK. He 
stated that, “[W]ithout expecting the state to change, the PKK must take the first steps to change – not as a 
simple step, but rather, as a strategic development. The current paradigm has realised its ambitions. What 
is needed now is a new paradigm to fulfil the demands for a solution.” The PKK showed its determination to 
solve the Kurdish question peacefully, by launching a Peace Project in its Seventh Extraordinary Congress 
on 20 January 2000. Other initiatives calling for peace and dialogue followed, including: the Urgent Action 
Plan for Peace and Democratisation (4 November 2000); the statement of urgent demands to prevent war 
and develop the process of solution (19 June 2001); the Charter for Urgent Solution (22 November 2002); 
and numerous letters enunciating PKK views on how to solve the Kurdish question and addressed to the 
president, prime minister, general commander of the army and all political parties – in both 2000 and 2002. 
15  For Öcalan’s own recollection and interpretation of this conspiracy, see Öcalan (2010).
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Despite these active efforts towards peace and dialogue, the Turkish state continued its efforts to 
annihilate the PKK. The coalition in power, namely the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi, MHP), the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi, DSP) and the Motherland Party (Anavatan 
Partisi, ANAP), wanted to exploit the international conjuncture dominated by the post-11-September 2001 
‘war-on-terror’ rhetoric. Believing that it provided the opportunity to secure enough international support 
to eradicate the PKK, they froze the dialogue process. PKK overtures were interpreted as signs of weakness 
or evidence that the problem was ‘finished’. The usual official Turkish policy was, “If guns are not firing, 
then the problem does not exist”. So, besides a few regulations regarding democratisation, the Turkish 
state did not address the root causes of the Kurdish question and the constitution drawn up after the 
military coup of 12 September 1980 remains in effect.
3.5  International impediments to resolving the Kurdish question
In May 2002, just as a channel for dialogue was being opened between Öcalan and the Turkish authorities 
and intelligence services, the EU put the PKK on their list of ‘terrorist organisations’, overlooking the fact 
that an armed conflict has been raging between the Turkish Armed Forces and the PKK since 1984. The PKK 
fulfils the characteristics of a military structure as specified by the 1949 Geneva Protocols and has signed 
an agreement compelling its obedience to the laws of armed conflict (Breau 2006).
Including the PKK in the EU list of terrorist organisations is a case of the EU disregarding its own rules 
because it did not clarify why the PKK was included (Breau 2001). The EU decision dealt a massive blow 
to peace efforts. Not only did it strengthen the hand of the Turkish state in applying its usual repressive 
tactics (allowing the government to stamp any Kurdish organisations and activists as ‘terrorists’ or ‘terrorist 
supporters’), but the timing was most unfortunate. The PKK had just started its period of transition: clearly 
they were no longer using arms and had abandoned separatist aspirations in favour of searching for a 
solution within Turkey. Three years previously, the PKK had declared a unilateral ceasefire and withdrawn 
its armed forces outside Turkey’s borders. Moreover, the PKK was gradually giving up its aspirations for 
a Kurdish nation-state, aspiring instead to a decentralised political system based on equality, enhanced 
cultural and linguistic rights, popular and social freedom, and the active participation of citizens in shaping 
their society. In fact, in January 2002 the PKK had officially dissolved itself during a press conference in 
Brussels attended by many international journalists. The EU decision, which seemed to ignore all the 
positive steps taken by the Kurdish movement, caused many Kurds to lose faith in the EU and question 
why the EU was working against them. The European states’ historical role in dividing up Kurdistan, the 
broken promises of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the EU’s treatment of Öcalan and finally labelling the 
PKK a ‘terrorist organisation’ confirmed Kurds’ belief that the EU supported the Turkish state’s war against 
them. The saying, “Kurdish people have no friends but the mountains”, was shown to be true once again.
The AKP government, who had just come to power in Turkey, interpreted the EU decision to list the 
PKK as a terrorist organisation as international support for taking a violent approach to the Kurdish issue. 
It repeated the same mistake when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, calculating that after the US 
had removed Saddam’s threat to the region, they would cooperate with Turkey against the PKK as part of 
the ‘war on terror’. Turkey discarded its policy of dialogue and stepped up its violent persecution of the 
Kurdish freedom movement. On 1 June 2004, the PKK decided to shift from ‘passive self-defence’ to ‘active 
self-defence’. It also changed its method of struggle from continuous to periodic conflict, whereby PKK 
guerrilla forces staged attacks to dissuade the Turkish Armed Forces from attacking and oppressing the 
people – and to protect themselves. PKK activity was accompanied by mass demonstrations showing the 
Kurdish people’s support for its new policy.
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4  The PKK’s transformation and  
the new paradigm
The capture of their leader by means of an international conspiracy dealt a massive blow to the PKK and 
the Kurdish people, causing them to be embroiled in internal arguments from 2000 to 2004. Some cadres 
(with support from external forces such as the US government), sought to destroy the very essence of the 
PKK and failing to do so, left the movement and started a propaganda campaign against it. In response to 
the internal disputes, Öcalan developed a new strategy that was embraced by the mainstream PKK (the 
founding cadres) and created a new sense of direction that revived the movement. 
Since the early 1990s, Öcalan had been aware of the changing balance in world politics, especially 
the disintegration of the bipolar (East/West) world system. He believed that the PKK had to adopt certain 
strategic changes in order to survive as an independent movement. Formed in the late 1970s, the PKK was 
strongly influenced by the Real-Socialist system that had moulded global revolutionary movements and 
national liberation struggles. It had adopted the jargon of that age and the Marxist-Leninist approach to a 
nation’s right to self-determination through state formation. Within this framework, the PKK adopted the 
slogan of ‘independent, united and democratic Kurdistan’ – meaning it aspired to form a nation-state. Its 
political and military wings were organised accordingly.  
The subsequent end of the Real-Socialist system, along with new global developments and practical 
experiences in Kurdistan, forced the PKK to search for a new strategy. After introducing the Kurds of 
Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq to the international arena, the movement had to analyse global and regional 
developments anew and revise its quest for change into a comprehensive strategy: to that end, it redefined 
itself within Kurdistan, the region and the world. This section describes the evolution of the PKK’s ideology 
and structure in the period 2002/2005.
4.1  Establishment and features of the KCK system
Educational activities and discussions based on Öcalan’s defence to the ECHR led to changes in the PKK. 
The movement developed the thesis of ‘democratic modernity’, based on a democratic, ecological and 
gender-emancipatory system, and switched from being a party to a congressional system. 
During its congress in April 2002, the PKK dissolved itself and a new Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy 
Congress (KADEK) took its place. Öcalan continued to reflect and analyse the situation, and as part of the 
ongoing quest for change, KADEK dissolved itself in 2003 and was replaced by the Kurdistan People’s 
Congress (Kongra-Gel, KGK). This was an important stage in the search for a new paradigm. Öcalan, who 
was writing his book, In Defence of the People (2004), deemed Kongra-Gel an appropriate structure, but 
insufficient on its own.
In 2004, the PKK was reconstructed with a new identity: it became the ideological centre of the new 
system. The Union of Communities of Kurdistan (Koma Komalên Kurdistan, KKK) was established as the 
umbrella organisation of the new system at Newroz in Diyarbakir in 2005. One year later, the Kurdish name 
was changed to Koma Civakên Kurdistan (the Kurdish Communities Union, KCK), reflecting a slight change 
in emphasis. Kongra-Gel became the legislative assembly of the system, which continues to develop as an 
ideological, political and organisational tripartite. 
The PKK’s transformation into the KCK was based on historical analysis, and also represented an 
ideological and political revolution embodying the effort to create an organisational model suited to the 
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new paradigm and ideological outlook that Öcalan described in his writings. The movement developed 
specific solutions for each part of Kurdistan; the thesis of ‘democratic autonomy’ was developed for Turkish 
Kurdistan: a voluntary joint existence that did not require changing the borders of the current nation-state 
or demanding a separate state was desirable.
The first Chairman of the KCK Executive Council, Murat Karayılan, outlined the reasons for such a transition:
The KCK system represents a new understanding, a new mentality, a new organisational method, a 
new school and a new democratic understanding. Civilisation that developed out of the eco-system 
from the agricultural revolution in the Zagros region attained the Industrial Revolution in the 19th 
century. Along with the Industrial Revolution came the nation-states as a reality of human life. In our 
day, the nation-states that derived from the Industrial Revolution are hindering development in the 
face of a globalising world. Although financial capital that has developed under the system of nation-
states is trying to shape the globalising world towards its own interests, it is unable to surpass the 
chaos the system is undergoing. Solutions proposed in capitalist systems are unable to solve the 
problem. This is because the state and especially the nation-state are now retrogressive factors in 
Syria. Therefore, to find a fundamental solution – namely, an escape from the chaotic reality of the 
system – we need to approach the problem with a new mentality and method of organisation. Just like 
in the past, when Mesopotamia was the site of the first revolution in human history, today it will be the 
locale for the intervention to the current crisis of the system. Our leader (Abdullah Öcalan), through 
his practical struggle and his theorisations, has developed ‘democratic confederalism’ as the formula 
for the solution to the current crisis faced by humanity. We see the KCK as a model for its solution.16
It was not easy for an organisation that for so long had aspired to and struggled for an ‘independent, united 
and democratic’ Kurdistan to change its aspirations. At first, PKK cadres and movement sympathisers found 
the change difficult to comprehend. Along with misconceptions and misunderstandings, certain cadres 
were dismissive. The Turkish media – under unofficial state control – misconstrued Öcalan’s appeals for a 
peaceful solution and presented them as if he had “surrendered to the state and was sorry” (Milliyet 1999). 
Efforts were made to destroy Öcalan’s character and values. Meanwhile, various Kurdish cliques wanted 
to take advantage of this momentous period of transition and, using various derogatory terms for the PKK 
and Öcalan, tried to depict themselves as alternatives. However, the backbone of the PKK – made up of the 
leading cadres, guerrillas and enthusiastic masses – embraced the transition and declared that despite 
all the efforts to smear Öcalan, they were determined to effect change. They announced the formation 
of organisational mechanisms in conformance with the transition, as well as reconstruction committees 
to support it. The KCK declaration presented at Newroz 2005, explained the new system and the means 
needed to construct it.
Here are a few excepts from this document:
[…] 2. The principle of a nation’s right to self-determination as developed in the beginning of the 20th 
century, has been interpreted to mean the right to form a state. The nation-states formed on this basis 
are now a hindrance to development. The United Nations model is no longer an effective institution. 
The Gulf War and the situation in Iraq are proof of this.   
3. The way out of this situation is not globalisation on the model of the nation-state, but rather the 
democratic confederative system that is supported by the people. The state is not eternal, nor is the 
nation-state immortal. Today, the nation-state is being superseded by globalisation. However, 
because the imperialist powers have been unable to develop a significantly new model, the crisis of 
the current system has deepened into chaos. 
16  Online at www.serxwebun.org/index.php?sys=arsiv&arsiv_id=9
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[…] 6. The self-determination of Kurdistan is about the aspiration to form a democracy that is not 
concerned with political borders – rather than the formation of a state on nationalist principles. 
Kurdish people in Iran, Turkey, Syria and Iraq will form their own federations and unite in a 
confederal superstructure.  
Democratic confederalism aspires to turn the state into an institution sensitive to democracy by 
removing all barriers to its democratisation. Three systems of law now rule Kurdistan: EU law, unitary 
state law and democratic confederal law. As long as the unitary states of Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Syria 
recognise the Kurdish people’s confederal law, the Kurdish people will reciprocate by recognising their 
laws so that a consensus can be reached.  
Democratic confederalism aims to solve all problems through peaceful means and relies on peaceful 
politics. Any hostile actions against the land, the people or their liberties will result in legitimate acts 
of self-defence. (Foreword of the KCK agreement)
As for the international level, it is important to mention the establishment of the Kurdistan National Congress 
(Kongra Netewiya Kurdistan, KNK) in Amsterdam in May 1999, which aims to: incarnate the moral unity of 
the Kurdish nation, without ignoring how Kurdistan has been divided between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria; 
resolve disunity or conflict between Kurdish political parties; elaborate norms of solidarity and develop a 
concerted strategy for democratic solution to the Kurdish question. Membership is also open to the Assyrian-
Syriac-Chaldean, Armenian, Jewish, Arab, Turkmen, Azeri, Turkish and Persian minorities in Kurdistan.17 
4.2  The PKK and the women’s struggle
The participation of women in the PKK’s founding congress anchored the attitude that women’s struggle 
for liberation is the basis of the social struggle. Starting in 1987, Kurdish leader Öcalan concentrated on 
writing about women, family, society, patriarchy and the social, philosophical, cultural, economic and 
psychological effects of women’s colonisation. He determined that women’s enslavement is the fundamental 
contradiction preventing societal freedom and championed women’s liberation as the only way to bring 
about social enlightenment, democratic change and an emancipatory mentality. Women guerrillas are 
not just provided with military education, they are also encouraged to become the new individuals of a 
democratic free society. The Kurdish women’s movement has developed into a philosophical and social 
movement and female PKK militants have become its leading social force. The women’s movement takes 
its own decisions, democratically choosing its goals and administration in its congresses and conferences. 
Among the numerous parties and organisations pursuing this ideology of women’s liberation under the 
umbrella organisation, the High Women’s Council (Koma Jinên Bilind, KJB), are: the intellectual and 
strategising Kurdistan Women’s Liberation Party (Partîya Azadîya Jin a Kurdistan, PAJK); the grassroots-
level Unions of Free Women (Yekitiyên Jinên Azad, YJA); the Free Women’s Units ‘Star’ (Yeknîyên Jinên 
Azad Star, YJA Star) which employs strategies of legitimate self-defence; and the Committee of Young 
Women who engage in organising their peers. Women’s struggle for liberation is not viewed as a mere 
fight for equality – since constitutional equality is meaningless if the cultural structure and mentality of 
the society remain unchanged. The struggle must address every aspect of the revolution. Women must 
decide for themselves, meaning that the women’s struggle must organise throughout Kurdistan using a 
more horizontal organisation and overcoming marginal party politics. The Kurdish women’s movement 
helps guarantee the social transformation required for a free society.18
17  The KNK could be perhaps best compared with the African National Congress (ANC) in apartheid South Africa, or with the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) prior to the Oslo Accords – although it is not a military organisation.
18  A more detailed description of various women’s organisations established throughout the Kurdish struggle is found in Annex III 
(Chronology).
24
 Adem Uzun
4.3  The PKK and its policy of armed resistance
The PKK considers that its most significant transition was in its approach to war and violence. At first the 
PKK was a movement that aimed at power and statehood using armed struggle to achieve this end. Later, 
the principle of national liberation was understood as self-defence, since global examples of the past 70 
years showed that using arms had not helped people liberate themselves.
On 15 August 1984, six years after its establishment, the PKK formed the Kurdistan Liberation Forces 
(Hêzên Rizgariya Kurdistan, HRK), acting as the army of the liberation movement. In 1986, the HRK was 
replaced by the People’s Liberation Army of Kurdistan (Artêşa Rizgariya Gelê Kurdistan, ARGK), which 
idealised the ‘guerrilla’ army. Following Abdullah Öcalan’s entrapment, the ARGK pulled out of Turkey on 
2 August 1999, and relocated to South Kurdistan (Northern Iraq), where it underwent a period of transition 
and was replaced by the People’s Defence Force (Hêzên Parastina Gel, HPG) in 2000.
The HPG announced that rather than fighting a war of liberation it would organise around the principle 
of self-defence described by the United Nations, stating: “[W]herever there is a degradation of humanity, 
where justice does not prevail and violence diminishes human values, the people being victimised have 
the right to defend themselves in every way possible”. Organisational, war and defence tactics were 
reorganised. The movement endorsed and signed the Geneva Convention and the additional protocols of 
June 1977 on the protection of victims of armed conflicts. On 18 July 2006, Kongra-Gel and the Swiss NGO, 
Geneva Call, signed a ‘deed of commitment’ banning anti-personnel mines which is supported by the UN, 
in the Alabama Room at the Geneva Town Hall, where many historical agreements have been signed:
International humanitarian law and human rights include all sides to armed conflicts… 
Acknowledging the norm of a total ban on anti-personnel mines established by the 1977 Ottawa 
Treaty[…we] solemnly commit ourselves to the following terms. (Ongan and Aktas 2006)
5  Unilateral ceasefires, indirect 
dialogue and political repression 
Although the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), which came to power in 
2002, hesitated at first, eventually it began to dialogue with the PKK. As a result, the PKK declared unilateral 
ceasefires in 2006, 2008, 2009 and 2010. Unfortunately, none of these steps brought about a lasting peace, 
mostly because of the AKP approach: the government took steps just before general and local elections, 
attempting to create conflict-free periods. But it was obvious that the AKP was aiming to strengthen its grip 
on power by developing tactical short-term relations and temporary steps – not a strategy to bring about 
a lasting solution. This section describes the period 2005–2010, marked by a series of attempts at conflict 
resolution, along with periods of renewed confrontation characterised by state repression of Kurdish 
political activities.
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5.1  From the KCK’s declaration of military inaction to the October   
2006 ceasefire
Following the PKK’s return to ‘active self-defence’ in 2004, some Turkish and Kurdish intellectuals 
concluded that the conflict was heating up because of the AKP government’s faulty analyses. In August of 
2005, they visited the Turkish Prime Minister and demanded a democratic solution to the Kurdish question. 
A few days later, Erdoğan visited the city of Diyarbakir, where he stated that the “Kurdish problem is my 
problem and … will be solved with the deepening of democracy”.
His statement raised hopes in the Kurdish community, and there were calls for the PKK to declare 
a ceasefire. In response, on 19 August 2005 the KCK Executive Council declared a month-long period of 
military inaction that was later extended for another month. However, at the same time, the Turkish army 
declared that “military operations will continue until there is not one single person in the mountains” and 
stepped up attacks. Heavy clashes ended the PKK’s declared period of military inactivity. Intense clashes 
followed in spring and summer of 2006, accompanied by ongoing talks. Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and 
the President of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Masud Barzani, were in dialogue with both sides and 
called for a ceasefire. The US Secretary of State made similar calls. Most importantly, the Turkish state was 
talking with the Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) – the first time that the Turkish state accepted 
Kurdish names. Meetings with Öcalan also took place. The concrete steps needed to resolve the issue were 
discussed at these meetings, which included two PKK peace groups (one from Europe and one made up of 
PKK militants deployed in South Kurdistan); in return, the Turkish state was supposed to begin amending 
certain laws. In light of the positive news the PKK declared a ceasefire on 1 October 2006.
These positive developments occurred just before a general election in Turkey, causing some of the 
Kurdish electorate to interpret them as the Kurdish Freedom Movement’s approval of the AKP. As a result 
the AKP gained in Kurdish areas in the 2007 elections. But once again, the AKP misread the situation by 
pointing at the support it received from Kurds and claiming to be the number one party in the region and 
the representative of the Kurdish people. 
After using opportunities offered by the PKK to win the elections, the AKP began to change its stance 
on the Kurdish question. The quest for a peaceful solution was replaced by policies of armed annihilation 
and views that “There is no Kurdish question if you do not think about it” and “Our security forces will 
do whatever is necessary regardless of whether it involves women or children”.19 On 17 October 2007, a 
bill was passed giving the military permission to conduct cross-border offensives attacking the PKK. On 5 
November 2007, seeking international support, Prime Minister Erdoğan visited US President G. W. Bush in 
Washington, DC, who declared that the PKK was their common enemy and that the US government would 
support Turkey’s war against the PKK by all possible means, including supplying intelligence. Predator 
drones began to monitor the mountains of Kurdistan and Turkish bombings caused numerous civilian 
casualties. The Turkish state also shared intelligence received from the United States with Iran, who 
bombed civilian settlements in Iraqi Kurdistan, trying to hit guerrillas of the Free Life Party of Kurdistan 
(Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê, PJAK), an Iranian Kurdish Movement. The ‘enemies’ – Iran and the USA 
– became allies against the Kurdish people. The Turkish military then conducted operations on both sides 
of its borders and met with even bigger offensives from the guerrillas. After a year or so, a new quest for 
peace began to emerge, leading to renewed calls for a ceasefire. Both the Turkish and Kurdish people were 
feeling the painful consequences of war and started to call for a peaceful solution.
19  Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, at the Turkish Grand Assembly in March 2008.
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5.2  The unofficial ceasefire of December 2008 and the declared 
ceasefire of April 2009
In order for the people to be heard and to allow the 2009 general elections to be securely conducted, 
the PKK ceased fire unofficially in December 2008. The Turkish state learned of this decision through 
intermediaries and, with the Turkish Armed Forces also generally inactive, the elections were held in a 
peaceful atmosphere. En route to Iran, on 10 March 2009, the President of Turkey made a very positive 
speech about the Kurdish question to journalists, stating, “Good things are about to happen”. This raised 
expectations and created a positive atmosphere. 
In March 2009, the DTP won 99 local councils, doubling its share of votes. The AKP, who had not 
expected the Kurdish party to be so successful, displayed its discomfort in a speech by the Deputy Prime 
Minister Cemil Çiçek, who said, “[The DTP has] pushed to the border of Armenia”. Indeed, the Kurdish party 
had won the city council of Iğdir, a Kurdish city on the Armenian border. Throughout history, Armenians 
and Kurds have been described as “enemies wishing to divide Turkey”.20 In the PKK’s early years, the 
Turkish state and army claimed that although Kurds were Muslim, the PKK was actually an Armenian (non-
Muslim) organisation bent on dividing Turkey. The Çiçek statement shows that this mentality persists. 
People threatened by the Kurdish party’s success claimed that Kurds and Armenians were going to join 
forces to avenge history and divide Turkey, a view that is still heard in Turkey. 
Despite these negative developments and encouraged by the DTP’s electoral success, the PKK made its 
ceasefire official on 13 April 2009. However, the state sabotaged its decision: just as everyone was expecting 
a positive response from the AKP government, 52 key members of the DTP, including deputy leaders, were 
arrested. Since then 1,700 Kurdish politicians have been arrested, including Hatip Dicle, the co-chair of the 
civil-society movement, Democratic Society Congress (Demokratik Toplum Kongresi, DTK). 
While arrests were ongoing, the government announced the ‘process of democratic opening’ and 
conducted a ‘Kurdish workshop’ at the Ankara Police Academy on 1 August 2009. Although in some quarters 
this was seen as a positive development, these attempts occurred when persecution was intensifying, 
causing others to understand that the government had no serious project for a solution, but was hoping to 
stall the process. The government was seen as trying to ensure a period of military calm for a referendum 
on changes to the constitution – just as it had before the local elections in March 2009. 
Discussions about military inactivity, a democratic opening and a solution were being held at the 
same time as the ‘KCK Operations’.21 On 11 December 2009, the Constitutional Court banned the DTP 
and expelled 37 Kurdish MPs including party co-chairs Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tuğluk. In response, the 
remaining Kurdish MPs that had been elected as independent candidates boycotted Parliament and 
returned to Diyarbakir, effectively cutting all relations between Kurds and the Turkish state, and sending 
a strong message that Parliament did not represent Kurds in Turkey. The AKP government was so shocked 
by this move that it immediately sent representatives to visit Öcalan in prison. They argued that they were 
aiming to make changes but that the judiciary were preventing them, and that they were unhappy with 
its ruling and planned to discuss the matter in Parliament. Öcalan responded that Parliament was the 
address for a solution. Kurdish politicians called off their boycott – but the AKP government soon forgot 
its promises and continued its repressive policies, leading Öcalan to state, “[I]f no positive steps are taken 
as soon as possible, on 31 May I will pull out of everything”. The AKP took no note of him, and the KCK 
released a statement on 1 June 2010, declaring that all the steps they and their leader had taken for a 
peaceful and democratic solution had been rebuffed, and were even being used against the PKK. For this 
20  At the time of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, in the name of creating a homogenous nation, the Turks massacred 
Armenians and forced hundreds of thousands of them to flee. Since 1923, Turkey’s official history and schoolbooks have taught 
that the Armenians were trying to divide the country and brought about ‘conflict’. The Turkish nation has always been poisoned with 
nationalism and hatred towards the Armenian people.
21  This refers to massive repression of any kind of Kurdish activism in Turkey – that began in 2009 and continues today.
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reason, the decision to halt military activity had to be reviewed: their forces returned to the position of 
active self-defence.
5.3  The unilateral ceasefire of August 2010
In summer 2010, major clashes occurred all over Turkey and Kurdistan. The Turkish media was filled 
with reports of disturbances and the heavy loss of life. On 12 September 2010, a major referendum was 
scheduled on constitutional amendments, and the government wanted to conduct it in a calm atmosphere. 
For that, they had to talk with Öcalan and urge him to declare a ceasefire. Many civil society organisations, 
intellectuals, the DTK and also the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) that had replaced the banned DTP, 
called for a mutual ceasefire. Taking note of these requests, Öcalan stated that he was still “hopeful of 
peace, and if a serious and sincere approach to peace develops then I will be more than happy to play 
my role”. Believing that dialogue was a sign of progress, he called upon both sides to engage in sincere 
dialogue. His call was made at a time when clashes were leading to all-out war. 
Öcalan’s message led the KCK to declare that for the referendum on 12 September to be conducted in 
a peaceful atmosphere during the sacred month of Ramadan, in response to calls from various quarters, 
including the DTK and the BDP, they had taken a meaningful decision. The KCK listed a number of 
conditions that had to be met before it would declare a unilateral ceasefire, some of which had to be urgently 
implemented, while others were about principle. The KCK stated that from 13 August to 20 September their 
forces would not conduct any military offensives but would defend themselves against any hostilities to 
themselves or the people. It further stated that in order for this temporary process to be permanent, the 
Turkish state should cease all military and political operations. Another demand was the release of all 
1,700 imprisoned Kurdish politicians and members of peace groups. It further stated that the time had 
come for Öcalan to be a party to the negotiations. 
The Muslims of Turkey enjoyed a peaceful Ramadan. The ceasefire also strengthened the AKP 
government’s effort to push through certain constitutional amendments: 58 per cent of the voters approved 
amendments on judicial reforms, abolishing protection for leaders of the 12 September 1980 coup and 
for military personnel, as well as economic and social rights and individual freedoms. However, the BDP 
and over half the population of southeast Turkey boycotted the referendum (Wikipedia 2010), because it 
included nothing to satisfy the Kurdish people. In particular, it did not address their demands for democratic 
autonomy, or their fundamental rights and freedoms. Yet the AKP read voter approval as encouragement to 
increase its repressive policies rather than take steps towards a peaceful solution. 
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6  The Oslo Meetings:  
official dialogue between the 
Turkish state, PKK and Öcalan
Although state repression intensified during 2009 and 2010, the referendum had indicated that the 
public favoured the two sides reaching a peaceful solution. Many intellectuals were publishing 
articles that called for an open dialogue instead of closed-door meetings. It was becoming clear 
that both the Kurdish and Turkish people wanted to move from violence to peace. Finally, secret 
communication with Öcalan was replaced by a series of official meetings. Although he had had 
many direct and indirect contacts with the state since 1993, these meetings were far more significant 
and substantial – especially because they had the approval of the Turkish public. Öcalan was also 
allowed to meet regularly with his lawyers (who were flown to İmralı Island by helicopter), whereas 
in the past their meetings had always been blocked by trivial excuses.
Parallel to these meetings, high-level talks were being conducted between the Turkish state 
and the PKK in Oslo, Norway – although they were only disclosed to the public later. The PKK 
had already conducted meetings with Turkish officials, but the state had always sought to gain 
time for new offensives. Its approach to the Oslo meetings was similar. According to Prime Minister 
Erdoğan, “[I]ntelligence agents met the Kurdish representative to gain information, and to act 
accordingly” (Korucu 2014). For its part, however, the Kurdish Freedom Movement approached the 
meetings seriously, seeking to prepare society and the state for a solution, and repeatedly declaring 
ceasefires. The process of dialogue undertaken by the PKK from 2009 to 2011 is described below.
6.1  The PKK roadmap
In 2010, after initial talks with the government delegation, Öcalan announced the need for a roadmap 
to solidify the dialogue and quest for a peaceful solution. He called upon all parts of society to 
consider the project and inform him of their thoughts and opinions. The Kurdish people began a 
period of discussion and presented their views to Öcalan. Similar excitement inspired democratic 
quarters and columnists in Turkey and hopes and expectations grew. For the first time Turks and 
Kurds believed that a solution was close. On 15 August 200922 Öcalan declared that he had finished 
the roadmap and given it to the prison administration to be sent to the ECHR. But the Turkish 
state held on to the document for fourteen months. Many well-known authors and columnists 
commented that the PKK had presented its project for a peaceful solution but the Turkish state did 
not appreciate its roadmap and had no counter-proposal. Öcalan declared that despite the state’s 
apparent lack of a project or game plan, he would take further steps in order to break the impasse. 
22  This represents a symbolic date in the Kurdish struggle: on this date in 1984 the PKK launched its guerrilla war.
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6.2  The peace groups
With the aim of opening dialogue between the government and the PKK, under Öcalan’s leadership, 
a peace group composed of 34 people from the United Nations (UN) Mahmur refugee camp  and eight 
guerrillas from Kandil (both in South Kurdistan) entered Turkey on 19 October 2009. After being questioned 
at the border, they left for Diyarbakir, escorted by hundreds of thousands of jubilant people. Interpreting 
joyous cries as provocative triumphalism on the part of the PKK, Turkish nationalists and government 
members ensured that the joy was short-lived. Once the peace groups had arrived, the main opposition 
– the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) and the Republican People’s Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) – began to advocate repressive measures. Some members of the peace 
group were arrested while others declared that they could not safely remain in the country and returned to 
South Kurdistan. Because the government lacked any serious project for a solution, they characterised the 
displays of joy as a crisis of the ‘democratic opening’,23 claiming that the “PKK’s and the Kurdish people’s 
joy thwarted us”. That joy should have been interpreted as an ecstatic response to the approach of peace. 
The Turkish state’s reaction and declaration that any other peace group would face similar consequences 
caused another peace group planning to come from Europe to cancel its journey.
6.3  Operations and pressure against legal Kurdish politics
In the operations against Kurdish politicians that had begun in April 2009, hundreds of people were 
arrested – including former MPs, local mayors, representatives of civil institutions and party activists. The 
DTP was banned, and its MPs forbidden to be politically active. 
The Kurdish movement had anticipated the DTP’s banning and quickly formed the BDP. But it, too, 
was unable to escape the state’s repressive measures. In order to overcome the 10 per cent threshold in the 
general elections of 12 June 2011, the BDP entered independent candidates in a coalition with a few other 
political parties, and succeeded in getting 36 of its candidates elected to Parliament.24 Six of the candidates 
were in prison and were not released.25
The Turkish state wants the BDP to sever its ties with the PKK and declare the PKK a terrorist organisation. 
Officials in the EU and USA second this demand. The BDP maintains that it has no organic ties with the 
PKK but that the overwhelming majority its supporters also support the PKK. The BDP views the PKK as 
armed opposition to the state, and claims that its relationship with the PKK helps it pressure the latter into 
renouncing arms, although the BDP does not regard that as its role. The BDP argues that if the state really 
wants to solve the Kurdish question, it must negotiate directly with the PKK. The BDP supports the Turkish 
state meeting with Öcalan in İmralı Prison and with PKK officials in Oslo. However, the state overlooks the 
party’s positive stance, and constantly pressures the BDP, claiming that it is “supporting terrorism”.
6.4  Cessation of dialogue
Within the framework of the peace talks, the government committee had accepted Öcalan’s proposal for 
a three-step process to resolve the conflict (ceasefire, constitutional reform and  normalisation, with the 
23  The government first announced a process of ‘Kurdish opening’ but in reaction to nationalists’ rejection later called it the 
‘democratic opening’. The name had to be changed once more to ‘the process of national unity and fraternity’. But ‘national unity’ 
defines all people living in Turkey as ‘Turkish’.
24  The 10% threshold is an anti-democratic measure introduced to keep Kurdish politicians out of Parliament and forces Kurdish 
parties to present independent candidates. Without that threshold, the same proportion of votes would have yielded the BDP closer 
to 60 MPs. In the previous election, the Kurdish party had also entered independent candidates and obtained 22 seats in 
Parliament.
25 Four of the six elected MPs started open-ended hunger strikes in prison on 15 February 2012, the anniversary of Öcalan’s 
capture, demanding that negotiations be restarted with Öcalan and a peaceful solution be found to the Kurdish question. The court 
was forced to release all the MPs in January 2014.
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PKK becoming a political actor in Turkey); a positive approach was expected after the general election in 
June 2011. However, using the death of soldiers who were on a military operation in the Silvan region of 
Amed (Diyarbakir) and the DTK’s declaration of ‘democratic autonomy’ (see below) as excuses, the AKP 
government declared, “[N]othing will be the same as before, they will pay a heavy price: nobody should 
expect good will from us” – and implemented its long-planned policy of asymmetric war. From 27 June 2011, 
the government stopped meeting with Öcalan and also prevented him meeting with his lawyers and family.
The government then used the state-controlled media to promote the idea that the “PKK had cut off the 
meetings”. On 5 October 2011 Murat Karayılan, Chairman of the KCK Executive Council, wrote a letter to the 
editor of Taraf, a newspaper that vigorously upheld the state’s claims. His letter (see Annex II) explained 
the reasons for ending the meetings and exposed the manipulation and disinformation surrounding the 
Kurdish question. It also shed light on what had transpired in the Oslo talks and what is needed to create 
an atmosphere conducive to forging a lasting peace.
6.5  The search for alternative democratic methods
When its efforts at dialogue were rebuffed, the Kurdish movement declared that if the state refused a 
democratic constitutional solution, it would seek to force one upon the AKP through alternative democratic 
methods – and if this did not succeed, the Kurdish people would have to create their own democratic 
political solution. Expecting nothing more from the state, the DTK declared the Kurdish people’s ‘democratic 
autonomy’ on 14 July 2011. This model for autonomy for Kurds in Turkey is not about power: the PKK has 
distanced itself from ruling. But it believes this is the way for Kurdish society to develop its political will 
and achieve basic democratic rights. 
Apparently these developments threatened the AKP because it had no proposals of its own for a 
democratic solution. Why else would it be so afraid of Kurds attempting to develop democracy by structuring 
their own democratic autonomy? The government attempted to annihilate the will of the Kurdish people 
who were demanding a democratic solution by using the judicial system against the BDP. It sought to make 
it impossible for Kurds to demand a democratic solution. 
Then the ‘KCK operations’ begun in 2009 were revived, leading to thousands of arrests (Yuksekovahaber 
2013). Most of Öcalan’s lawyers were arrested, along with many Kurdish journalists. Since April 2009, 8,000 
people, including MPs, mayors, journalists, solicitors, human rights activists, intellectuals, writers and 
academics, have been arrested; hundreds of Kurdish children languish in Turkish prisons for throwing 
stones at the police during demonstrations.
6.6  The power struggle within the state structure 
On 13 September 2011, a recording of the secret meetings in Oslo between PKK officers and Turkish officials 
was leaked on the Dicle News Agency’s website without the knowledge of the site’s administrators. Later, 
the Bianet website reported that in a meeting with Turkish journalists in early 2013, Murat Karayılan, 
Chairman of the KCK Executive Council, had stated that the ‘Oslo Meetings’ had actually started in 2005. 
The manner in which the tape was leaked on the Dicle website and subsequent announcements made 
clear that a third party was involved. Yet Prime Minister Erdoğan blamed the KCK for leaking the tape and 
announced that the meetings had ended (Milliyet 2012). Soon after, the AKP government further isolated 
Öcalan by postponing meetings with his lawyers.
On 7 February 2012, state prosecutors called on Hakan Fidan, the director of the National Intelligence 
Service (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MIT), MIT assistant director, Afet Guneş, and former MIT director, Emre 
Taner, to issue statements about their meetings in Oslo regarding the “case of the KCK” (Aynaheber 2012). 
The prosecutors clearly intended to send state officials who had attended the meetings to prison.
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Concerned that he himself was being targeted, Erdoğan insisted that neither Fidan nor any other MIT 
officials would provide statements. The friction between the executive and the judiciary made it clear that 
the Oslo meetings were ended because of a conflict within the state structure. However, believing it was 
being cornered, the AKP once again changed its approach and opened a new battlefront with the KCK. Two 
days later the government passed a law requiring the prime minister’s permission to try MIT officials.
7  The status quo: fear of peace
Instead of opting for peaceful and democratic means to resolve the conflict, the Turkish state has repeatedly 
shown its contempt for democracy by arresting, detaining and repressing legal political representatives of 
the Kurds (e.g. denying them the right to express themselves in their mother tongue). But Kurdish leaders 
have taken the initiative once again by launching a bold programme of democratic negotiations aimed at 
introducing long-due legal and judicial reforms. This last section describes these recent developments, 
from late 2012 until the end of 2013. 
7.1  The 2013 İmralı Peace Process: a new hope?
In the second half of 2012, imprisoned PKK members began an indefinite hunger strike in response to the 
AKP government’s aggressive approach (Bestanuce 2013). On 17 November 2012, as the hunger strikers 
were nearing death, Öcalan called on them to stop. He also warned of serious developments in Rojava or 
Western Kurdistan (Syria).26 Öcalan’s call was heeded; the imprisoned PKK militants ended their strike. 
Shortly thereafter, Erdoğan announced that a new dialogue process between state officials and Öcalan had 
started on İmralı Island.
On 23 February 2013, Öcalan told the BDP delegation visiting him on İmralı Island that the state 
prosecutor’s efforts to bring the MIT officials to trial five months earlier were an attempted coup. He said 
that he had subsequently written to the government, an effort that led to a new dialogue process. Öcalan 
stated that he was going to submit written documents to the KCK administrators and the BDP and make a 
public announcement at the 2013 Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakir.27 
That is indeed what happened. Öcalan’s historic manifesto was read to more than a million people 
gathered in Diyarbakir for the Newroz celebrations on 21 March 2013. Öcalan declared the start of a new 
era (Sendika 2013). He called upon the KCK to declare a ceasefire and withdraw its armed units from 
North Kurdistan. He also made detailed suggestions to the government, noting the necessary legislative 
amendments and steps required to advance the process.
In response to Öcalan’s call, the KCK declared a ceasefire on 23 March 2013. In May 2013 its announcement 
of preparations for a retreat – the beginning of the guerrillas’ withdrawal from North Kurdistan – was 
observed by the international press. 
26 For a description of the ongoing revolution in Syria and Western Kurdistan, see Annex III.
27  For the full text of the declaration in english, see www.kurdishinfo.com/ocalans-newroz-letter-meaning-and-consequences. 
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7.2     Unfulfilled obligations in the new peace process
The peace process that the KCK negotiated with the government was supposed to consist of three stages. 
The first stage consisted of a bilateral ceasefire, trust-building steps and the implementation of practical 
mechanisms. The second stage was concerned with the legal and constitutional amendments that are at the 
heart and root of the Kurdish question. The third and final stage, described as ‘normalisation’, foresaw the 
prisons being emptied, the return of Kurds in the mountains and in exile, and everyone being permitted to 
take part in politics.28 Unfortunately, the government did not stick to its agreement, deeming the calendar 
‘ineffective’.
While the Kurdish side has taken gradual and strategic steps forward, the AKP government has not 
moved at all. By now, a truth and reconciliation committee should have been formed, Parliament should 
have passed legal amendments in support of the process, terminally ill prisoners should have been released 
and an advisory group formed. All these steps have been prevented by the government, which passed a law 
to protect its own civil servants but did not take any similar measures to protect the peace process. As it 
stands, anyone taking part could be accused of breaking the law and be jailed at any moment. 
The AKP’s active insistence on hindering the main actors of the peace process shows that it has an 
ulterior motive. In particular, the fact that Öcalan, the architect of the process, continues to be prevented 
from having any contact with the outside world casts doubts on the government’s sincerity. BDP Co-
chair, Selahattin Demirtaş, announced, “[T]he government promised to assist the retreat of the guerrillas 
and enable Öcalan to have contact with the public; but these promises were not kept” (Haber 2013). The 
government has not refuted his statement. Instead of making legal amendments to enable a smooth 
process, it actually has enforced arbitrary measures to raise its stature within the dialogue; for instance, it 
banned publication of photographs taken on İmralı Island of Öcalan and the BDP delegation.
The AKP, or more precisely, Prime Minister Erdoğan, formed a group of experts that also amounted 
to nothing. The group included 62 ‘wise people’ (including 12 women) – artists, politicians, academics, 
journalists, business people and civil society delegates, from Turkey’s seven regions. The group prepared a 
report that was presented to the prime minister with the expectation that the recommendations would be 
addressed by Erdoğan’s ‘democratisation’ packet. That did not happen. Professor Baskın Oran, a member 
of the group, announced that he quit because the government did not take the legislative steps promised 
after the guerrillas had begun their retreat. The group is presently inactive (Milliyet 2013).
Instead of the promised legislative amendments, the AKP government is pressing ahead – building 
more fortress-like military barracks in Kurdistan and stepping up military activity. It appears that the 
government intends to maintain the military option. The Turkish military practically ended the ceasefire 
by killing a civilian during a protest against one of the barracks in Şirnak. In response to the governments’ 
tactics aimed at dragging out the peace process, on 9 September 2013 the KCK announced that the 
ceasefire was being held but the guerrillas’ retreat would be halted. At the same time that a ceasefire was 
implemented in Turkey, the government was supporting the war against the Kurds in Syria by supporting 
Al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadist organisations such as the Al-Nusra Front.
In a meeting with his family on 18 November 2013, Öcalan described the government’s stance: 
“We told them to make the legal amendments and the guerrillas would leave the country. They could 
have left sooner, in just two months. But the state and the government did nothing. Because they did 
nothing, this is the most that could have happened. No legal framework was prepared. Had the state 
done this, the guerrillas could have even left in buses, retreating comfortably. But the framework was 
not prepared. This is why the process is continuing like this today.”29
28  Online at http://firatajans.com/news/guncel
29  Online at http://firatajans.com/news/guncel
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The Turkish state’s mentality prevents even the most basic laws being passed to support the peace process, 
let alone make a paradigm shift. It prefers to address the Kurdish issue with its ‘terror law’ mentality. A 
sweeping change is needed in the official ideology; without that, there is no platform for permanent peace. 
With the revival of EU–Turkey negotiations, it is incumbent upon the EU to persuade Turkey to adopt a 
principled paradigm shift. This must be the litmus test for relations between the EU and Turkey.
Conclusion
When it was founded, the PKK believed that there was no possibility of mounting a political campaign 
on behalf of the Kurdish people when even small-scale activism was severely punished. Inspired by other 
national liberation movements and agreeing with their tactics, the PKK adopted their ideological and 
military approaches. It opted for waging a long-term people’s war to defeat Turkish colonialism and force 
the Turkish government to acknowledge the Kurds.
Over the years, the PKK’s view of war evolved and it adopted a new strategy to replace the classic 
“defence, balance, attack” mentality of a revolutionary people’s war. After 1990, the Kurdish people’s 
struggle was characterised by guerrilla war and mass uprisings. Since the turn of the millennium, the 
democratic political struggle has grown in importance, and along with mass uprisings has become as 
important as guerrilla warfare, which was reoriented towards acts of legitimate self-defence. The PKK 
struggle has become more complex, with a broader array of strategies. Especially since 1993, PKK leader 
Öcalan has emphasised the importance of a democratic political solution by declaring various unilateral 
ceasefires. The global situation, the Kurdish people’s organisational maturity and consciousness, as well 
as the broader general awareness of the Kurdish question – including on the part of the Turkish public – all 
make a democratic political solution possible. A need no longer exists to defeat the Turkish state and its 
army through the methods of war alone. 
Despite all these efforts, however, the Turkish state has shown no interest in a democratic political 
solution and has attempted to exclude the PKK from a possible solution. The AKP has repeatedly claimed 
that it would solve the Kurdish question, yet it refuses to accept the Kurdish people as a national community 
with a democratic will that can determine its own fate. Kurdish demands for education in their mother 
tongue, the use of Kurdish in the public domain and cultural freedom have never been taken seriously. The 
Turkish state apparently believes that it could make a few minor reforms and allow some individual rights 
and the problem would disappear. It has never touched on the roots of the problem or sought to understand 
its history. As a result, the proposed solutions have continued the usual state policies of suppression, 
elimination and annihilation. 
Although Turkey is considered to be one of the most modern states in the region, its rulers are unable 
to resolve a problem democratically. They regard the Kurdish struggle for democracy as a threat that will 
eventually rock their authority. The same problem confronts Iranian and Arab states, where one nation 
and one religion are prioritised and other ethnic and religious groups are alienated and prohibited from 
forming their own democratic civil organisations. Any activity that is not part of the official ideology, the 
official nation, the official language, the official culture and the official politics is viewed as a crime, and 
labelled ‘treacherous’. 
When one compares the tools available to the Turkish state with those available to the PKK, it is 
obvious that the state is far better equipped to take larger and more significant steps. However, the state has 
almost always wanted to come out on top by expecting the Kurds to ‘surrender’ or be satisfied with minimal 
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compromises, supposedly because of a need to satisfy the opposition. But 90 per cent of the people and 
the opposition support the government taking positive steps towards a peaceful solution. Occasionally the 
government claims that its own laws obstruct progress, which is nonsense given the fact that the ruling 
party received 50 per cent of the general vote in an election when it promised to draft a new constitution. 
All opinion polls show that the people of Turkey support solving the Kurdish question through a new 
constitution. 
In an article in Taraf from 5 May 2012, Turkish journalist Roni Margulies explained why the Kurdish 
question has not yet been resolved.
The problem is neither the Kurds, the PKK, nor arms. The problem is the attempts, since 1926, by the 
state to resolve this issue using violence. We must not forget this. The solution remains stopping the 
injustice. As long as the state attempts to resolve the issue using a military approach, those seeking 
justice with arms will not stop, cannot be stopped and will continue. There is no example in history 
where people have been oppressed forever with guns and military methods. For this war to end it is 
the responsibility of everyone who is Turkish, righteous and mindful to demand rights for everyone 
who is demanding their rights – and to explain that the only way for this war to end is for the people 
who are demanding their rights to be given them. To appeal for one side in the war to lay down their 
arms while the war is going on is pointless. Arms can only be put down after certain conditions are 
met and guarantees given. The responsibility of intelligent Turks is not to call for one side to lay down 
their arms, but to call on the other side to recognise that side’s rights.
The Turkish people are ready for a solution, but there is no courageous political will to solve the problem. 
The history of the Turkish and Kurdish people could be transformed into a tremendous forward march 
towards democracy that is as important, if not more, for the people as water and petrol. A future based on 
democratic norms is crucial for the Turkish, Iranian and Arab peoples. Kurds do not seek to threaten; they 
want to live in peace with others. Rather than being used as a tool to ‘divide and rule’ they want to be a 
unifying force on a strong and free basis. They do not want to be the tools of oppressive forces but rather 
deserve to be viewed as a democratic force in the region’s march towards democracy. This project could 
serve as a role model for the whole Middle East.
Institutionalising democracy requires sensitivity. Sovereign religions and sovereign nations represent 
similar mentalities that are ill suited to democracy. Transitioning to democratic institutionalisation is 
particularly difficult because democratic institutions define themselves in terms of the state. The new 
democratic version of the Turkish nation-state presupposes freedom of language and culture.
At this stage, the EU and the US are as important as the Turkish government in solving the Kurdish 
question. Unfortunately their support encourages the Turkish state to leave the problem unsolved. Were this 
support to become conditional, the road to peace would be smoother. The most significant step which might 
be taken in support of a peaceful solution would be to remove the PKK from the so-called EU terrorist list.
When we regard the Kurdish struggle and its current phase, we can see that a solution to the Kurdish 
question is forcing itself onto the global agenda. However, it cannot be solved using a narrow national 
approach: the Kurdish people want to forge a common future with other people of the region. The roots 
of the problem are universal in nature and the solution to the problem must be universal. Only a broad 
perspective can ensure a permanent solution to the Kurdish question. The dialogue process between the 
Turkish state and the PKK and Öcalan must be restarted. No solution that excludes Öcalan and the PKK is 
possible. 
This paper has sought to show that the Kurdish people have sought to solve the Kurdish question 
through peaceful dialogue and negotiation, while the Turkish state’s approach has used policies of 
assimilation, delay and oppression. Had the state taken a different approach to the process of dialogue 
and the numerous peace proposals presented by Öcalan, we might have been discussing this situation 
differently today. Nevertheless, I believe that only negotiations will lead to a solution. 
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Annex I:  List of Acronyms
AKP  Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi   Justice and Development Party 
ANAP  Anavatan Partisi    Motherland Part
ARGK  Artêşa Rizgariya Gelê Kurdistan   People’s Liberation Army of Kurdistan
BDP  Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi   Peace and Democracy Party 
CHP  Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi    Republican People’s Party  
DSP  Demokratik Sol Partisi    Democratic Left Party 
DTK    Demokratik Toplum Kongresi   Democratic Society Congress
DTP  Demokratik Toplum Partisi   Democratic Society Party
DYP  Dogru Yol Partisi    True Path Party 
ECHR       European Court of Human Rights 
ENKS  Encumena Niştimaniya Kurdên Sûriyeyê  National Assembly of Syrian Kurdistan
HEP  Halkın Emek Partisi    People’s Labour Party
HPG  Hêzên Parastina Gel    People’s Defence Force
HRK  Hêzên Rizgariya Kurdistan  Kurdistan Liberation Forces
KADEK   Kongreya Azadî û Demokrasiya   Kurdistan Freedom and  
  Kurdistanê     Democracy Congress
KCK  Koma Civakên Kurdistan    Kurdish Communities Union 
KDP  Partîya Demokrata Kurdistanê   Kurdistan Democratic Party 
KJB  Koma Jinên Bilind   High Women’s Council
KKK  Koma Komalên Kurdistan   Union of Communities of Kurdistan
KNK   Kongra Netewiya Kurdistan   Kurdistan National Congress
KGK  Kongra-Gel     Kurdistan People’s Congress
KRG  Hikûmetî Herêmî Kurdistan  Kurdistan Regional Government
KSC  Desteya Bilind a Kurd   Kurdish Supreme Committee
MGRK  Meclîsa Gelê Rojavaya Kurdistan   People’s Assembly of Western Kurdistan
MHP  Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi    Nationalist Movement Party 
MIT  Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı   National Intelligence Service 
OHAL  olağanüstü hal     state of emergency 
ISIS        Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham 
PAJK  Partîya Azadîya Jin a Kurdistan  Kurdistan Women’s Liberation Party 
PJAK  Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê   Free Life Party of Kurdistan 
PKDW  Parlemanê Kurdistan Derveyî Welat Kurdistan Parliament in Exile
PKK  Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan   Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
YNK/PUK Yekitîya Niştimanî Kurdistan  Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
PYD  Partiya Yekitîya Demokrat   Democratic Union Party 
SHP  Sosyaldemokrat Halkcı Parti   Social Democratic People’s Party
SNC       Syrian National Council 
YJA  Yekitiyên Jinên Azad   Unions of Free Women 
YJA Star  Yeknîyên Jinên Azad Star   Free Women’s Units ‘Star’ 
YPG  Yekîneyên Parastina Gel          People’s Protection Unit
YPJ   Yekîneyên Parastina Jin    Women’s Protection Unit  
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Annex II:  Extracts of a letter by Murat Karayılan, the then Chairman of the KCK 
Executive Council, to the Taraf newspaper editor (5 October 2011) 
 (...) Mr. Altan, in the past five years we have had contact with the state; the first two years consisted of 
indirect contact and the last three years consisted of direct contact. A recording of one of these meetings 
has been leaked into the public domain from an unidentified source. It was agreed that these meetings 
would be kept secret until they had reached a substantial level. There are previous examples from the past 
of such dialogues that have been kept secret till a certain stage then announced to the public domain when 
it has been seen fit to do so. It is a well-known fact that the same delegation also had meetings with our 
leader in İmralı prison. Both meetings were held and developed in parallel in a complimentary manner. 
However, we did not cut off the meetings as you claim. You ask “why did you leave the negotiations 
and intensify the war?” You then claim that to this we reply “we left the negotiations because of the KCK 
operations”. Before everything else, I would like to say that I have never used a sentence like “we left the 
negotiations because of the KCK operations”; purely because we did not leave the negotiating table. What 
I did say is that the KCK operations were one of the main reasons as to why negotiations ended without a 
positive result. (...)
We are not an organisation that wants to fight or is in love with war or arms, we are not even an 
organisation that is seeking to attain its aspirations through the use of arms. We have removed the use of 
arms as means to revolution. According to us, the use of arms had fulfilled its duty in the 90s by putting the 
Kurdish question on the agenda. It is for this reason that the leader of our movement has made efforts solve 
this problem peacefully and we are working in parallel for such a solution. However, this is also a reality: 
there exists in the mountains an organised armed force that have formed their own system beginning in 
1984 and systematically developing from 1999 onwards. This force consists of thousands of fighters does 
not consist of a few hundred people as is the case in the examples of the IRA and ETA. The existence of this 
force is one of the realities of the Kurdish question; we, however, on the grounds of a peaceful solution to 
the Kurdish question, have openly stated that we are open to reorganising this force. The solution of the 
Kurdish question and the guerrilla forces are closely tied to one and other. Those who are incapable of 
perceiving this reality will be unable to develop a plausible solution. This force has taken to the mountains 
for freedom, it has not suffered defeat, but rather it has succeeded in spreading its struggle to millions. You 
cannot expect such a force to just dissolve itself. Only in the case of a peaceful solution can this force be 
incorporated into social life. This is only possible through dialogue and societal reconciliation. (...)
You claim that just as the state was about to fulfil the demands of the Kurdish people we ruined 
everything. We are not the side who restarted the war. In Sirnak-Guclukonak on the 14th of March in 2011, in 
Bingol-Adakli on the 18th of March, in Hatay-Hassa on the 1st of April, in Maras Pazarcik on the 20th of April, 
in Dersim-Pulumur on the 27th of April, in Sirnak-Uludere on the 15th of May and in Sivas-Imranli on the 
14th of May 49 of our friends were martyred as a result of the state’s military operations. At the time, these 
friends of ours were not conducting any military activities and were only active in fulfilling daily needs, 
required to stay alive. They were murdered – most of them through means outlawed in international law 
(chemical weapons etc.) – by the state that you claim was about fulfil the demands of the Kurdish people. 
Even the clash in Silvan was born out of a military offensive conducted by the Turkish army to annihilate 
our guerrillas. However, in a clash not only one side always suffers losses, sometimes the other side can 
suffer heavy losses too. This is what happened in Silvan. 
However, the AKP government, who had already decided a year ago to eradicate our movement, used 
the Silvan incident as an excuse. If this was not the planned route, then an agreement would not have been 
struck with Iran during the winter months and large budgets would not be decided upon for plans to form 
a special army and police force.
It is true that the KCK operations had started on the 14th of April 2009. You ask me “why did you leave 
the negotiations now and not two years ago?” I must first state that the delegation that we were meeting 
was claiming that they too were against the political operations against Kurdish politicians and were trying 
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to bring an end to them. They were even saying that when the court cases begun the prisoners would be 
freed in gradual stages. However, what actually happened was that when the cases began the prisoners 
were not even allowed to defend themselves in Kurdish let alone be allowed to walk free. On top of this, the 
political operations continued. 
If the state had the intention of freeing the Kurdish politicians why are they making such an issue out 
of defending themselves in their mother tongue? Was it really so difficult to solve this problem? Is it not a 
contradiction that on the one hand you claim to have wanted to solve the question through political means 
but on the other hand you are imprisoning the very people who are the political force behind the solution 
as members of the KCK?
Other than what I have already stated, the main reason as to why the negotiations ended was that the 
protocols for a solution presented to the Prime Minister was not accepted by him and left unanswered (The 
delegation of the state had asked Öcalan on İmralı and the PKK in Oslo for a preparation of a protocol which 
was subsequently prepared Mr. Öcalan). If the state, as you claim, had stated that they were going to “give 
autonomy, language rights and free Öcalan” then surely at the very least it would have stopped its military 
operations and not a single bullet would have been fired. I must say that the first time I had heard the above 
mentioned pledges was from you. It is true that these demands are in the protocol. However, although the 
delegation that we met did not approach these demands in a negative manner, the government itself did 
not even see the need to reply to these demands and even more to the contrary sharpened its language 
against us.  
I do not know if you do not follow or watch the developments. When the process entered an impasse, 
our leader Apo, in his meeting with his solicitors on the 18th of July, said “the Prime Minister can make a 
call; if he says that ‘we do not believe that this problem can be solved by the use of arms. We are going to 
solve this problem through a democratic constitution’ then we can solve this problem in a week”. Did you 
not hear this call? Of course you must have heard it. It is obvious that you behave as if you haven’t heard 
it because it does not suit your calculations. I do not say this to you personally, but to all those who blame 
us on this issue. Did our leader make these statements on behalf of our organisation or not? It is certain he 
did because they are published documents. Well then, was their any statement of intent in response to our 
leaders statement from the Turkish Prime Minister, or anyone related to the government for that matter. No. 
Instead the government was using strong language in indicating it will crush terrorism. Did you not watch 
this either? It is at this point that I would like to remind you of the language that AKP representatives were 
using regarding the crisis of the elected MPs in prison. In short, when we look at this process as a whole we 
see that no mentality of a solution was developed by the state or the AKP. Let alone fundamental pledges 
for “autonomy, language rights and the freedom of our leader Apo”, not even soft messages were being 
given. (...)
Mr. Altan, some of the writers at your newspaper, people whose names I do not even want to mention, 
are constantly trying to show that we restarted the war by apparently quoting some of the speeches made 
by our friends as a way to clear the AKP by distorting the truth. I know I have written too long but I must 
clarify this point: At every juncture in history, the Kurdish people have always been deceived by states. This 
has almost become fate. So much so, that when I was a child I had heard the village elders say that “even 
if the state is a donkey, still do not ride it”. Another example may be the words of Seyit Riza before he was 
hanged during the uprising of Dersim which we will never forget, “I could not cope with your deceit may 
this be a lesson to me, but I did not kneel down to you and may that be a nuisance to you”. These words 
are the words of experience but at the same time are the reminders of the fact that the Kurdish people have 
always been deceived by states. 
I am not arguing that the state is deceiving us now; because for the first time in their history, the 
Kurdish people have a leader and organisation that will not be deceived and mislead. We knew that the 
state did not possess a mentality for solution but saw that the delegation had intended to put effort in 
towards this end. We knew that we also had the responsibility of developing this mentality in the state and 
this is what we tried to do. We continued to stay at the negotiation table despite many of the promises that 
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had been given to us not being fulfilled. However, as the Kurdistan Freedom Movement, from the lessons 
we have learnt from the past, were always prepared for the possibility of this being another manoeuvre 
intended to eradicate our movement. We were fully sincere in our quest for a peaceful solution but were 
also weary of a hostile approach. 
Mr. Altan, as you are aware, the Kurdish question is a fundamental problem of the Republic. There 
is a need for a political will and a historical leadership for the solution of the problem to materialise. It 
is certain that this type of leader must take huge risks while walking the path he or she believes is the 
path to the peaceful future of its people. The Prime Minister took such risks in order to win the elections. 
The Prime Minister’s perspective consists of certain reforms to please the Kurds in order to tie them to his 
party... he wanted the 2009 local elections to be conducted in a peaceful atmosphere and we ensured that 
this was the case. Then it became important for the Prime Minister to secure a peaceful atmosphere for the 
referendum on the 12th of September, this was realised too. He may not have particularly liked our stance 
on the referendum topic but his main concern was military inactivity. In order to succeed in the 12th of 
June elections, there had to be a peaceful atmosphere, this too was provided. The ceasefire was ongoing 
from the referendum and continued through to the elections, despite us suffering casualties in the spring. 
However, the Prime Minister wrote all these down as his own successes. He disregarded our leader’s efforts 
and our movement’s efforts in securing the above mentioned details. He thought these all came about from 
the success of his witty foresight. Finally, after the elections on the 12th of June, he put into action his real 
plan. This is what happened. If you really want to know the truth, here it is. 
(...) The Prime Minister is hoping for us to take a step backwards and is deploying the massive 
military might in his power because he thinks he can achieve this. I know very well that he has been 
working tirelessly for the past two years to acquire technological weaponry, such as unmanned planes for 
assassination, in order to have us assassinated. I am asking you: why would someone that is apparently in 
a quest for a peaceful solution be in the hunt for such technologically advance weapons of assassination?
(...) The AKP government by isolating our leader, deploying military offensives against our movement 
and conducting political operations against Kurdish politicians is aiming to intimidate and suppress the 
movement. In the Prime Minister’s words he is aiming to marginalise us in this way. This is a comprehensive 
project that the state has been working on for the past year or so. It is no coincidence that many media 
representatives close to the government kept giving the Tamil’s as an example. However, as soon as Iran’s 
ill advised attempt in Kandil faltered, the Turkish Prime Minister made statements rejecting the Tamil 
example.
(...) This is why we are insisting that: there is no more need to shed more blood. If you continue 
to suppress this people, they will begin to look for alternatives. However, our primary preference is a 
voluntary and free union. This is why, just as Mr. Hasan Cemal says, even if this war continues for decades, 
the eventual destination will be the negotiating table. It is now clearly evident that the opposing forces 
cannot eradicate one or the other through war. This is why no one should force the other to degrade or 
dishonour itself. We must solve this problem through mutual respect. This problem is not a problem of 
terrorism, it is a social problem. We are ready for a peaceful solution on these grounds, but we as the PKK, 
or any honourable Kurd for that matter, cannot accept dishonour and annihilation.
(...)We are hoping to solve this problem through peace, not war. This is our strategy. When we say this, 
the first thing we hear is “then leave your weapons and declare a ceasefire”. Until today we have declared 
eight ceasefires but all have been dismissed. If the state wants to solve the Kurdish question peacefully, 
then the Prime Minister must respond to the call made by our leader Apo. In order to secure a permanent 
peace our leader must be given the necessary opportunity to do so through a “healthy, secure and free” 
atmosphere and then this problem will be solved within a week”.
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Annex III: The revolution in Syria and in Western Kurdistan (Rojava)
The peace process in Turkey cannot be separated from developments in other parts of Kurdistan and the 
Middle East. Any development, whether positive or negative, directly impacts the peace process. The 
Turkish state continues to oppose any positive developments in the rest of Kurdistan on the grounds that 
they will inspire its Kurdish population. This can easily be seen in Syria where the Turkish state secretively 
supports Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, both logistically and militarily. In return for its support of rebels, 
Turkey demands that the Syrian National Coalition not recognise the Kurds. The British magazine, The 
Economist, wrote in October 2013 that the subject with the greatest potential to derail the peace process 
between the Turkish government and Abdullah Öcalan is government support for the Al-Qaeda-affiliated 
groups fighting the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitîya Demokrat, PYD) in in northern Syria, 
also called Western Kurdistan or Rojava.30
It has been three years since the uprising started in Syria, and it seems that its fate will determine 
the destiny of the Middle East. Although it appears to be a war between the Baath regime and an armed 
opposition, the US, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Turkey and many European states have 
become involved. Some of these states are supporting the regime, while others are backing the opposition – 
causing the war to drag on, and leading to tens of thousands of people dying, millions fleeing and Syria being 
destroyed. Hatred among various peoples and inter-faith violence grows by the day. Since the beginning, 
however, the Kurds have insisted that they prefer peaceful methods for solving the current problems, and 
refuse to side with either the regime or the opposition, because neither recognises the Kurdish people’s 
natural and democratic rights. All contacts between the Kurdish people and the opposition have come to 
nought because of the latter’s chauvinist demeanour. 
In an interview with the Turkish daily newspaper Taraf, Veysel Ayhan stated:
When the initial movements began against Bashar Assad in Syria, Turkey was saying that it was 
prepared to support the rightful demands of the people of Syria. Today there are regions that are 
being governed by the Syrian National Council (SNC). Funnily enough, we are not demanding the 
abolishment of these administrations, yet we are calling for the disbandment of the administrations in 
the Kurdish regions. We are opposing the autonomous administrations established in the Kurdish 
regions, yet we are not demanding anything similar for the administrations in the Sunni Arab regions. 
We do not say that Arabs “should not form autonomous regions”. Syria is home to Christians, Alawites 
and Druse. Maybe an autonomous Alawite region will be formed. If the Alawites and the Druse say, 
“[W]e will form an autonomous region” will Turkey also oppose them?31
The Kurds have distanced themselves from both violent sides, preferring their own ‘Third Way’, which 
proposes fair representation of all peoples and identities within a unitary Syria; it welcomes a diplomatic 
solution, regards no one as an enemy and seeks only to defend itself against external hostilities. It works 
for the application of the democratic autonomy project founded on the principle of the peoples’ shared 
destiny. The Kurds have chosen an alternative that foresees a joint future, not only for ethnic groups such 
as Kurds, Arabs, Armenians, Assyrians, Chechens and Turcomans, but also for religious identities such as 
Christian, Muslim, Yezidi, Sunni and Alawite. The Kurds did not take part in the war and only organised 
themselves both socially and militarily to defend their regions. On 19 July 2012, the Kurdish People’s 
Protection Unit (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG) stormed government buildings in the Kurdish city Kobanê32 
and forced government forces to leave the city. The city administration fled without a fight, and the town 
was handed over to the People’s Assembly of Western Kurdistan (MGRK). The same later happened in 
30  Online at  http://t24.com.tr/haber/turkiye-el-kaideye-destegi-surdururse-cozum-sureci-raydan-cikar/241147 
31  Online at www.taraf.com.tr/nese-duzel/makale-veysel-ayhan-kurtler-ucuncu-yolu-tercih-etti.htm 
32 Kobanê is a city in West Kurdistan on the Turkish border with only Kurdish inhabitants.
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Source: http://guncelyorum-canadil.blogspot.fr/p/bat-kurdistanrojava-devrimi.html.
When the Baath Party seized power in Syria in 1963, the situation of the Kurds took a turn for the worse. 
The Baathists singled out the Kurds from the Cezîre region, seeing them as a potential threat, and adopted 
a policy of displacing them and repopulating the region with Arabs; this was the beginning of the ‘Arab 
Belt’.33 The Baath Party even went as far as forcefully seizing land from the Kurds and handing it over to 
the new Arab settlers, forcing tens of thousands of Kurds to flee to Aleppo and Damascus. Furthermore, the 
regime made it illegal for Kurds to use Kurdish in school and refused to grant them citizenship or passports; 
the Kurds became an oppressed, stateless minority. They could neither buy land nor attend university.34 
Despite oppressing the Kurdish people, the Baath regime always turned a blind eye to Kurdish 
33  The ‘Arab Belt’ is the name of the policy of arabising the Kurdish regions. Since 1963, the Baath Party, under the slogan 
‘Protecting the Arabness of Cezîre’, began to move Syrian Arabs to the Cezîre region. See http://guernica.tv/rojavada-savas-ve-
devrim/. For example, the town of Til Ebyad, located between Cezîre and Kobanê, now populated by both Kurds and Arabs, is part of 
the Arab Belt. It has been controlled by the terrorist organisation Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) since March 2013.
34  See www.zaman.com.tr/yorum_suriyede-kurtlerin-kalbini-kazanma-mucadelesi_1247081.html   
two other Kurdish border towns, Efrîn and Cizrê: both towns were ceded to the people. What has now 
gone down in Kurdish history as the ‘Revolution of Western (Rojava) Kurdistan’ has consolidated Kurdish 
aspirations: The Kurds have reinforced their autonomy and organised themselves in a bottom-up fashion 
– from civil organisations for doctors, engineers, teachers and youth, as well as trade unions and women’s 
assemblies, to general assemblies. They have also formed economic committees. Now the Kurds want to 
be granted political status, or at the very least, want the areas they defend and control to be recognised. 
It would be useful to take a look at the history of the situation to better understand the current 
circumstances and the feasibility of the Kurdish project.
Syria was formed as a result of the 1921 London Agreement between France and the Kemalist 
administration. As a consequence of this agreement, a border was drawn between the Kurds of the North 
and the Kurds of the southwest: the former group was ruled by Turkey, the latter by the French mandate 
power in (Arab) Syria.
The nearly three million Kurds living in Syria were never granted citizenship by the Baath regime. The 
Kurds mostly live in the Cezîre, Kobanê and Efrîn regions, sandwiched between North Kurdistan (Turkey) 
and South Kurdistan (Iraq), with a 700-km-long border with Turkey. Familial relations exist between the 
Kurds in Syria and the Kurds in Turkey, despite the border that runs right through the centre of some cities. 
Artificial borders have not prevented the Kurds from maintaining cross-border relationships. 
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leaders residing in Syria, a stance that had to do with Syria’s problems with Iraq and Turkey: it saw 
Kurdish organisations as useful bargaining chips against neighbouring states. This is why many Kurdish 
organisations that were unable to get established in neighbouring countries settled in Syria and why the 
Kurds of Rojava Kurdistan have always been close to the centre of Kurdish politics and been able to remain 
active throughout the years. The PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, lived in Syria between 1979 and 1998, when 
the PKK was founded, and led the PKK armed struggle and mass mobilisations from Syria. According to 
PKK records, thousands of Kurds from Rojava Kurdistan have joined the PKK. The PYD, which adopted 
Öcalan’s ideology and projects, is the most widely supported party in Rojava. The People’s Assembly of 
Western Kurdistan (Meclîsa Gelê Rojavaya Kurdistan, MGRK) and the National Assembly of Syrian Kurdistan 
(Encumena Niştimaniya Kurdên Sûriyeyê, ENKS) signed the Erbil Agreement forming the Kurdish Supreme 
Council (KSC) on 24 July 2012, in Qamishlo, the largest Rojavan city. The KSC carries out military, civilian 
and political work. On 21 January 2014, the KSC declared the Kurdish cantons – inspired by the Swiss 
model  – to be autonomous, in a step towards democratic autonomy. The Turkish daily newspaper Milliyet 
announced this news on 18 February 2014: 
The Autonomous Rojava Legislative Assembly declared that it had divided the region into three 
cantons which are Cezîre, Kobanê and Efrîn. Each canton will form its own autonomous 
administration. The Legislative Assembly accepted the Social Contract. According to this, the four 
pillars of the new system are the Canton system, the Legislative Assembly, Administration, Justice and 
the Supreme Election Council. The Legislative Assembly, as the representative of the Kurds, Arabs, 
Assyrians, Chechens and Armenians, see Rojava Kurdistan as an integral part of a future 
decentralised Syria.35
Kurds from Rojava Kurdistan, who regard themselves as part of a democratic Syria, must fight against 
regime forces and Al-Qaeda-affiliated Salafist groups such as Jabhat Al-Nusra (formed in July 2011 as 
the initially-unofficial Syrian wing of Al-Qaeda in Iraq) and ISIS. Kurdish military forces of the YPG and 
the Women’s Protection Unit (Yekîneyên Parastina Jin, YPJ) have successfully repelled these Salafist 
organisations, although it has reportedly cost the lives of some 600 Kurdish fighters. The Salafists aim to 
establish an Islamic state in the Kurdish regions. According to the news portal ntvmsnbc.com: “[A] general 
of the Free Syrian Army … stated that Al-Qaeda is beginning to implement an Islamic state in the north of 
the country”.36 Considering the aspirations of these organisations and the Syrian regime, it is clear that the 
Kurdish people have their work cut out for them. The KSC was not invited to the second Geneva Conference 
held on 22 January 2014. But the Kurds insist that they are not hostile to anyone and just want to live freely 
among all the peoples of a democratic Syria. For the peace process to succeed in Turkey (North Kurdistan), 
the Turkish state must change its attitude towards Rojava Kurdistan. Öcalan has always stated that the 
Turkish state should adopt a more friendly approach to the Kurds of Rojava Kurdistan. To assure stability 
in the Middle East, the status of the Kurds of Rojava must be recognised. 
35  Online at http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/suriyeli-kurtlerden-ozerklik-ilani/gundem/detay/1825157/default.htm 
36  Online at www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25455209/  
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Annex IV: CHRONOLOGY
From the PKK to the KCK
1973 Abdullah Öcalan, a sympathiser of the leftist movement in Turkey, meets with a few of his 
friends to discuss the need to organise independently.
1977 After Hakki Karer, a leading member of the group, is murdered the PKK is formed.
1978 In the Kurdish city of Maraş, fascists encouraged by the Turkish state massacre one 
thousand Alevis. Prior to the attack the homes of Alevi citizens were marked.
Öcalan’s group gains mass support. State-backed feudal landowners begin to attack the 
group, and both sides suffer heavy casualties – especially in the region of Hilvan–Siverek. 
26–28 November: The PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) is officially founded.
1980 12 September: A military coup is staged; the prime minister, leader of the opposition, 
government ministers and tens of thousands of people are imprisoned. Many prisoners are 
sentenced to death and most of the sentences are carried out. The Army chief who led the 
coup then drafts a new fascist constitution and declares himself president.
1980-1984 Abdullah Öcalan and a few other PKK cadres go to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon (under 
Palestinian control) for political and military education.
1981 22–27 September:  The First Congress of the PKK is held.
1982 21 March: One of the founders of the PKK, Mazlum Doğan, commits suicide to protest the 
treatment suffered by prisoners in Diyarbakir Prison. On the Kurdish holiday of Newroz, 
traditionally celebrated with bonfires, he lights three matchsticks, calling on the Kurdish 
people to revolt, then hangs himself. 
17 May: Four PKK prisoners (Ferhat Kurtay, Eşref Anyık, Mahmut Zengin and Necmi Öner) 
hold hands and burn themselves alive to protest their inhumane treatment in Diyarbakir 
Prison.
14 July: PKK prisoners in Diyarbakir announce that they are going to fast to death. This 
is a turning point in Kurdish politics; a death fast is being conducted for the first time on 
Kurdish lands. The leading cadres of the PKK, Hayri Durmuş, Kemal Pir, Ali Çiçek and Akif 
Yılmaz, die in September. Witnesses relate, “There was a battle of wills there. That battle 
was won by those people who put their lives on the line for a people”.
20–25 August:  The PKK’s Second Congress is held near the Turkish–Jordanian border. 
Major decisions are taken on such issues as returning to Kurdistan, cooperating with 
leftist movements, undertaking diplomatic activities, establishing military and political 
organisations, and Abdullah Öcalan’s continued leadership. 
25 August: The Kurdistan Liberation Forces (HRK) are formed. Öcalan states that the only 
response to the struggle in Diyarbakir Prison is to step up the struggle.
Kurdish artists in Europe form HUNERKOM, a cultural organisation (now known as 
‘TEVCAND’).
1983 In the first elections since the military coup, Turgut Özal is elected prime minister of Turkey. 
(He later becomes president and in 1993 initiates a dialogue with the PKK.)
1984 16 August: Under Mahsum Korkmaz’s command, the PKK launches its guerrilla war by 
attacking Turkish army bases. The state first claims that this was carried out by a few 
bandits; later it is obvious that this was not so.
1985 The Turkish state begins to understand that it needs help to cope with the PKK and forms 
a militia called the ‘village guards’.
21 March: The National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK) is formed in Kurdistan and 
later opens diplomatic bureaus in many European countries.
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1986 28 February: When the Swedish Prime Minister is assassinated, the Turkish state and 
Swedish intelligence service seek to blame the PKK in order to criminalise the organisation 
in Europe. Swedish intelligence later admits that the PKK was not involved.
28 March: Commander Mahsum Korkmaz (‘Agit’) is shot in the back and is killed. This 
represents a major setback for the organisation. The People’s Liberation Army of Kurdistan 
(ARGK) is formed in his remembrance.
25–30 October: The PKK holds its 3rd Congress, which is remembered as bringing 
ideological clarity to the PKK, in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley.
1987 A state of emergency that gives the regional governor all authority is declared in Kurdish 
towns.
Women take interest in the struggle and their numbers increase. A meeting with 2,000 
female delegates is organised in Cologne, Germany; the Kurdistan Patriotic Women’s 
Association (YJKW) is formed. The name is later changed to the Kurdistan Women’s 
Freedom Movement (TAJK).
The Union of Kurdish Youth (YCK) is formed (now called TECAK). 
1988 The German government begins police operations against the PKK in February. Leading 
cadres are arrested and tried in what is later called the Düsseldorf Case. (Duran Kalkan and 
Ali Haydar Kaytan are released from prison in 1993.)
1989 21 March: The first mass Newroz celebrations take place. Despite being forbidden, 
thousands of people attend and are attacked – many are killed – by Turkish security forces. 
1990 26–31 December: The PKK holds its 4th Congress in the mountains of Kurdistan.  At this 
congress, it is decided that guerrillas should aim to control land.
1991–1992 State-backed counter-insurgency forces start to carry out extra-judicial killings. Eventually, 
more than 17,000 people are eliminated, including human-rights activist, Vedat Aydın, 
74-year-old Kurdish intellectual Musa Anter, MP Mehmet Sincer and Kurdish businessmen, 
Behçet Canturk and Savaş Buldan. 
1992 21 March: Newroz celebrations are again attacked by state forces. More than 100 people die 
in the towns of Cizre, Şirnak and Nusaybin.
May: The first Kurdish daily newspaper ‘Ozgur Gundem’ is founded; bombs kill 13 
employees in its offices.
May: Elections are held for the Kurdistan National Assembly (in Iraq), with a turnout of 
90,000 voters. Delegates are elected from Kurdistan and Europe.
The Turkish state – with US backing and 300,000 soldiers – conduct a cross-border military 
operation against 10,000 guerrillas in Iraqi Kurdistan. NATO forces fight the PKK for the 
first time.
Kurds living in Germany organise a Kurdish Cultural Festival that is attended by 60,000 
people.
1993 20 March: The PKK declares a unilateral ceasefire in response to a call from Turkish 
President Turgut Özal.
The German state bans the PKK and its activities and closes down 34 Kurdish centres. 
1995 8–27 January: In Kurdistan the PKK conducts its 5th Congress, during which the PKK’s 
programme and flag are changed.
8 March: Female guerrillas congregate in the Medya Defence Region’s Metina area and in 
a meeting with 200 delegates (and no men) announce the formation of their autonomous 
‘Free Women’s Union of Kurdistan (YAJK)’. In 1999 some 300 women meet and change the 
YAJK’s name to the ‘Kurdistan Women Worker’s Party (PJKK)’.
The PKK signs the Geneva Convention, promising to abide by internationally agreed rules 
of war.
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The Kurdish Parliament in Exile (PKDW) is formed and the first Kurdish TV station (Med-
TV) goes on air.
The PKK announces a second unilateral ceasefire.
1996 Failed attempt to assassinate Abdullah Öcalan in the city of Sam. The PKK resumes 
hostilities against the Turkish state.
1998 8 March: PKK leader Öcalan presents his perspectives on women’s struggle as the ‘Woman’s 
Liberation Ideology’.
1 September: The PKK declares a third unilateral ceasefire.
1999 15 February: The international conspiracy that had forced Öcalan out of Syria on 9 October 
1998 eventually delivers him to Turkish officials in Nairobi, Kenya. 
January The PKK holds its 6th Congress in Kurdistan.  Öcalan’s capture is announced 
during the Congress, and the congress participants declare an all-out struggle.
24–26 May: The Kurdistan National Congress (Kongra Netewiya Kurdistan, KNK) is formed 
in Amsterdam. 
1999–2000 Öcalan’s trial begins on İmralı Island. He is sentenced to death but the ECHR intervenes to 
prevent the sentence being carried out. Öcalan announces strategic changes and advises 
the PKK to pull its armed forces out of Turkey. It does.
2000 23 January: The People’s Defence Force (HPG) is established as part of the PKK’s strategic 
transition with a military strategy based on on self-defence. 
2002 May: The EU lists the PKK as a ‘terrorist organisation’, strengthening the hand of the 
Turkish state just when the PKK had declared that it would quit active war. The decision of 
the EU strikes a blow to peace.
4–10 April: The PKK dissolves itself and forms the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy 
Congress (KADEK).
2003 27 October – 6 November: KADEK is replaced by the People’s Congress (Kongra-Gel), 
open to all people, not just cadres, and presided by a civilian.  
2004 The PKK declares that it is going to concentrate on ideological activities and not deal with 
administrative matters.
The Party of Free Women (PJA) changes its name to the Kurdistan Women’s Liberation Party 
(PAJK). The leading ideological party in the Kurdish women’s revolution, its programme 
focuses on free life, free women, free men and society, and militant leadership.
2005 17 May: The Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) is established as a result of Öcalan’s 
theories. Representing Kurds from all parts of Kurdistan, it is run by an executive council. 
2006 7–18 April: The establishment of the High Women’s Council (KJB) strengthens the Kurdish 
women’s movement.
October: The KCK declares a ceasefire at the request of government circles. However, the 
Turkish Armed Forces immediately launch military operations.
2007 Indirect dialogue between the Turkish state and the PKK is initiated by intermediaries in 
Oslo.
2009–2011 Öcalan meets regularly with the same Turkish delegation that meets with PKK officials in 
Oslo and agrees to write a roadmap for peace. However, the state confiscates the roadmap 
and only releases it 14 months later.
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2011
2012
2013
Öcalan prepares a protocol requested by the Turkish government delegation. He presents 
it to the PKK, which accepts it; he then presents it to the government, which leaves it 
unanswered and continues with its usual persecution and suppression. 
September: A Turkish news agency releases audio recordings of failed peace talks secretly 
held in Oslo between the MIT and senior PKK officials.
October: Kurdish rebels kill 24 Turkish soldiers in one of the deadliest attacks for years.
December: Thirty-four civilians are killed in a botched Turkish airstrike in Roboski near 
the Iraqi border.  September: Hundreds of imprisoned Kurds launch a hunger strike, 
demanding language rights and better prison conditions for Öcalan.
December: Ankara acknowledges nascent peace talks between the MIT and Öcalan with 
the goal of disarming 
January: Two Kurdish lawmakers pay a landmark visit to Öcalan in prison.
Three Kurdish activists, including PKK co-founder Sakine Cansız, are shot dead in Paris.
23 February: A second delegation of Kurdish lawmakers visits Öcalan in prison as part of 
the new peace efforts.
13 March: Kurdish rebels free eight Turkish prisoners in response to the peace push.
21 March: Öcalan calls for a ceasefire in a letter issued to mark the Kurdish New Year, 
telling militants to lay down their arms and leave Turkey.
A history of banned and reformed legal Kurdish parties
1990 7 October: The People’s Labour Party (HEP) is founded by 15 Kurdish MPs from the Social 
Democratic People’s Party (SHP) of Turkey who were kicked out for attending a Kurdish 
conference in Paris.
1991 The HEP wins 18 seats in general elections.
1992 The Constitutional Court bans the HEP. The Freedom and Democracy Party (OZDEP) is 
formed to replace it. Soon after, the court also bans OZDEP.
1993 7 May: With the HEP case ongoing, the Democracy Party (DEP) is formed.
1993 July: The Constitutional Court outlaws the HEP; all its MPs join the DEP.
1994 2 March: Kurdish MPs Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Doğan, Ahmet Turk, Sırrı Sakık and 
Mahmut Alınak lose their diplomatic immunity and are tried in the State Security Courts. 
They are sentenced to a total of 895 years. 
16 June: The DEP is banned. Most Kurds boycott the local elections.
May The People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) is founded under the leadership of Murat 
Bozlak. 
1995 24 December: HADEP takes part in the general elections in a coalition with a few leftist 
parties, but falling short of the 10% election threshold, is not represented in Parliament.
October: The Democratic People‘s Party (DEHAP) is formed under the leadership of Tuncer 
Bakırhan. 
1999 18 April: DEHAP wins no seats in Parliament due to the 10% threshold, but wins 37 local 
councils in the local elections. 
2003 13 March: HADEP is banned by the state and 46 of its activists are banned from politics. 
HADEP was the longest lasting legal Kurdish party.
Threatened by banning efforts, DEHAP dissolves itself.
2005 The Democratic Society Party (DTP) is founded and wins 69 local councils. It introduces 
the co-chair system to Turkish politics: Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tuğluk are appointed.
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2007 22 July: The DTP decides to participate in general elections by running independent 
candidates in an effort to pass the threshold: it wins 22 seats in Parliament.
2008 May: The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) is founded
2009 November: A case is opened against the DTP. The party wins 99 local councils. 
11 December: The Constitutional Court bans the DTP and expels Ahmet Turk and Aysel 
Tuğluk from Parliament.
2010 The DTP MPs join the BDP. Kurds boycott a referendum on amending the constitution 
because no amendments aim to solve the Kurdish question.
2011 12 June: The BDP takes part in the general elections by supporting independent candidates 
through the ‘Labour, Democracy and Freedom’ bloc. The party wins 36 seats in Parliament 
(including six imprisoned candidates who are not released).
Annex V: Map of Kurdistan  
Source: www.kurdica.com/News-sid-Sprachen-in-Kurdistan-767.html 
